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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of economic incentives to provide ecosystem 
services, and discuss potential policies and research methods to increase the net value of 
ecosystem services. The first two chapters evaluate the impact of economic incentives on 
deforestation rates and resulting tradeoffs between agricultural production and carbon 
sequestration in the Brazilian Amazon. I found that the opening of a port facility in 
Santarém in the Brazilian Amazon resulted in an immediate increase in the deforestation 
rate, 5.48% increase in 2003, and 11.70% in 2004.  The value of carbon released was 
over $100 million, which exceeds the value of agricultural production within the 
deforested area. Deforestation rates decreased starting in 2005 with the beginning of the 
Responsible Soy Project, a joint collaboration between agricultural multinational, Cargill, 
and an environmental NGO, The Nature Conservancy (TNC). It is less clear whether the 
decline in the deforestation rate in 2005 and thereafter was due to the project or a 
reversion to more normal rates of deforestation after the initial burst of land clearing with 
the port opening. These results emphasize the importance of timing. To be effective, 
environmental conservation projects should be in place prior to economic development 
activities that encourage deforestation. The third chapter discusses the importance of 
including agricultural production cost to calculate economic rent and constructs a 
globally consistent agricultural production cost data set. Omitting production cost results 
in overestimates of value from agricultural production and a failure to correctly identify 
areas with negative profit. Using the correct measure of economic rent is important in 
making land-use decisions and arriving at efficient land-use patterns. In summary, this 
dissertation shows that we can use land more efficiently and maximize net value of 
ecosystem services if we plan in advance and consider the correct value of multiple 
ecosystem services. 
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Chapter 1. Environmental Evaluations of Agricultural 
Multinational’s Deforestation Mitigation Efforts in the Amazon  
 
I. Introduction 
 
There often is a tradeoff between economic development and environmental 
conservation. Agricultural expansion in many developing countries has contributed to 
economic development through increased production of agricultural commodities but has 
also caused environmental degradation including widespread deforestation. For example, 
Brazil’s economic growth increased the country’s per capita real gross domestic product 
(GDP) 1.4 times from 1988 to 2014 while 407,511 km2 (8%) of the Legal Amazon was 
deforested during the same period (World Bank 2015; INPE 2015), an area comparable to 
the size of the state of California (423,967 km2). Deforestation leads to the release of 
carbon into the atmosphere and the loss of biodiversity, which have generated concerns 
from the international community about the consequences of agricultural expansion. 
Typically governments are responsible for monitoring economic activities and 
enforcing regulations to maintain environmental quality because many valuable 
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration are under-provided by markets. The 
government can use various ways to provide ecosystem services, including direct 
regulation, permit systems, taxes, or subsidies. Brazil has one of the most stringent set of 
environmental laws in the world. The Forest Code, enacted in 1965, strengthened in 1995 
and modified in 2012, requires 80% of each property in the Amazon be preserved as 
primary forest. Despite the strict law, however, rapid deforestation continued during 
much of this period until 2004, highlighting ineffective government monitoring and 
enforcement. Brazil cleared an average area of 17,633 km2 of forest per year from 1990 
to 2003. In 2004, 27,772 km2 of forest were cleared, the second highest annual total since 
1988 when annual record keeping began. Deforestation declined significantly in 
subsequent years.  By 2010 deforestation was 7,000 km2. Part of the success in reducing 
deforestation is an improved monitoring system and Brazilian government’s increased 
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enforcement of the environmental regulations (INPE 2015). However, deforestation has 
continued and it remains a problem in much of the Amazon area because of the region’s 
high value of carbon and other ecosystem services compared to the value of income 
generated from agricultural production or logging. 
An alternative route to monitoring and enforcement is a market-oriented approach 
that engages multinational companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
desires of consumers for sustainable products as well as commitments to corporate social 
responsibility may give corporations an incentive to enforce environmental regulations. 
The buying power of corporations can force farmers and other suppliers to comply with 
environmental laws. Environmental NGOs can provide assurance that environmental 
standards are upheld as well as technical expertise on environmental monitoring using 
remote sensing and other tools.  
In this paper, I investigate the performance of the Responsible Soy Project, a joint 
collaboration between Cargill, a multinational company, and The Nature Conservancy, an 
international conservation NGO. The Responsible Soy Project is an example of a new 
type of market-oriented approach to monitor and enforce environmental regulations, and 
in particular to reduce deforestation. More generally, I investigate conditions when 
economic incentives, enforced by multinational agricultural companies and monitored by 
NGOs, are effective in monitoring and enforcing environmental laws.  
In 2005, Cargill began working with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) on the 
Responsible Soy Project, a pilot project in the municipality of Santarém located near 
where the Tapajós River joins the Amazon River (Figure 1-1). Cargill opened a port 
facility in Santarém in 2003 to export soybeans. TNC tracked deforestation through a 
satellite monitoring system and Cargill agreed to buy soybeans only from farmers who 
had not deforested their land from the time of the start of the project. The project 
contributed to the establishment of the Soy Moratorium in 2006, where all major 
agricultural companies agreed not to buy soybeans from farmers who had deforested their 
land. NGOs, such as TNC, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Greenpeace, were 
responsible for oversight of the Soy Moratorium. 
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While there are many prior studies on the impact of market-oriented 
environmental projects undertaken by businesses, governments, and NGOs, none of these 
studies, to the authors’ knowledge, quantitatively evaluate the impact of conservation 
efforts by private companies and NGOs. Studies in the political science and business 
literatures conduct qualitative analyses of the causes and consequences of collaborations 
for environmental conservation among different stakeholders, including private 
companies, NGOs, government, and civil society (Büthe 2010; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 
2010; Mayer and Gereffi 2010). There are studies in the conservation and economics 
literature that quantitatively estimate the impact of market-oriented approaches such as 
payment for ecosystem services (PES) and sustainability certification system (Arriagada 
et al. 2010; Blackman and Rivera 2011; Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Miteva et al. 
2012; Pattanayak et al. 2010; Wunder et al. 2008). But these studies did not specifically 
evaluated the environmental impact of a project initiated by a private company and an 
NGO.  
I develop a simple model of a profit maximizing farmer to predict farmers’ 
deforestation and production decisions under the conditions of the Responsible Soy 
Project. I use a unique data set from the project to empirically test the hypothesis that the 
Responsible Soy Project significantly decreased deforestation. I use nearest neighbor 
covariate matching, difference-in-differences (DID), and matching-DID methods to 
compare deforestation rates between properties enrolled in the project (the treatment 
group) and properties not enrolled in the project (the control group) before and after the 
implementation of the Responsible Soy Project in 2005.  
The model and empirical estimation show consistent results. The model suggests 
that farmers who can take advantage of higher prices by selling soybeans to Cargill once 
the port opened in 2003 would engage in deforestation. However, once this deforestation 
is accomplished farmers would have little incentive to clear more land in subsequent 
years. Therefore, a ban on deforestation that is imposed after the opening of the port 
would likely be ineffective. Empirical estimates support these results. There was an 
increase in deforestation after the opening of the soybean export facility in 2003, 
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especially for farmers who sold soybeans to Cargill. Deforestation was reduced after the 
Responsible Soy Project began in 2005. Whether the reduction in deforestation was a 
result of intended deforestation already occurring or because of the initiation of the 
project is unclear. Both results from the model and empirical estimation highlight the 
importance of timing: for environmental regulations to be effective they should be put 
into place before there are economic incentives for environmentally destructive activities. 
 
II. Background 
 
Brazilian Amazon and Deforestation in the Santarém Area 
The Amazon rainforest is the largest rainforest in the world and is globally important for 
the carbon cycle and for its rich biodiversity. The modern history of deforestation in the 
Amazon begins in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The forest land in the Santarém region 
was cleared for rubber plantations and for the production of rice, corn, and other crops. 
The “Rubber Boom” accelerated after 1900 with the development of the automobile 
industry. The Brazilian rubber boom, however, was short-lived because of competition 
from Asian rubber suppliers and the invention of synthetic rubber. Many rubber 
plantations were subsequently abandoned. Some rubber plantations reverted to secondary 
forest while farmers grew corn and rice on other abandoned plantation land. In the 1970s 
black pepper plantations were developed and the federal government started to make 
investments in transportation infrastructure. This increase in economic activity caused 
renewed deforestation. Extraction of mineral resources in the 1980s brought additional 
population and economic activity to the Santarém region (Moraes 2010). By 2000, the 
cumulative deforestation rate in Santarém was 16% (3,756 km2) and as of 2010 the 
cumulative deforestation rate had reached 20% (4,586 km2).  
 
The Responsible Soy Project 
Cargill opened a grain terminal at the port of Santarém, located on the confluence of the 
Amazon and Tapajós Rivers in northern Brazil, in 2003 (see Figure 1-1). Cargill built the 
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facility because of increased congestion in southern Brazilian ports and to have an 
Amazonian port closer to European markets. Santarém is a regional center for trade and 
finance with waterway, road, and air transportation links. The Santarém port exports 
mostly soybeans from the state of Mato Grosso; 95% of the soybean production exported 
through the Cargill facility comes from Mato Grosso. The opening of the Santarém port 
also made soybean production in the Santarém area more attractive.  
In 2004, shortly after the grain terminal at Santarém opened, Cargill and TNC 
began discussions about how to ensure that Cargill operations did not increase 
deforestation. Though it was illegal to deforest more than 20% of land area in each 
property under the Forest Code, Cargill did not have a way to distinguish between 
farmers who were in compliance with the Forest Code and those had violated the law. 
Cargill and TNC had substantive discussions about the impact of road construction from 
the state of Mato Grosso to the Santarém municipality and a possible compliance tracking 
scheme for soybeans (Cleary 2004). This initial meeting led to the creation of the 
Responsible Soy Project, which was launched in December 2004. Between December 
2004 and June 2005, TNC and Cargill had meetings with farmers to explain the 
deforestation monitoring system and the reasons for such a system. In June 2005 Cargill 
informed farmers that they would only purchase soybeans from farmers who participated 
in the monitoring system. 
Cargill and TNC staff agreed on four main compliance criteria for farmers in 
order to receive financing and sell soybeans to the Cargill grain terminal in Santarém: i) 
no deforestation on their property; ii) legal compliance with the Forest Code; iii) 
compliance with ecological economic zoning (EEZ); and iv) registration in the rural 
environmental registration (CAR) system. Legal compliance with the Forest Code 
criterion includes restoration of Areas of Permanent Preservation (APP), which was one 
of the key elements of the Responsible Soy Project because of the ecological importance 
of APP for water resources and biodiversity. TNC, working with the Forest Ecology and 
Restoration Laboratory (LERF) from the University of São Paulo, trained farmers on how 
to restore APP. Farmers participating in the project are required to participate in or to 
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make plans for restoration of APP. The third criterion of the Responsible Soy Project 
mandates that soy areas be located within areas identified for consolidation or expansion 
of agricultural areas according to the EEZ, which establishes protected areas within a 
state. Farmers are prohibited from undertaking agricultural activities in these protected 
areas. The fourth criterion requires farmers to register their properties’ spatial boundary 
information with the CAR system to monitor and control farmers’ economic activities in 
their fields.  
Cargill was the only major buyer of soybeans in Santarém area and this gave 
Cargill considerable leverage in enforcing compliance with these criteria. The 
compliance criteria provided clear and simple standards for soy sourcing. Any observed 
deforestation from 2005 would exclude farmers from being able to sell to Cargill. For 
example, there were 15 properties (out of 383) in the project that did not meet the 
compliance criteria and were excluded from the project in 2008.  
To monitor whether farmers were satisfying zero deforestation and APP 
restoration requirements, TNC monitored properties every year by satellite imagery and 
field inspection. Yearly observation allows TNC to compare the differences in forest 
cover on the property. The first version of the database was established in June 2005. It 
covered the municipalities of Santarém and Belterra (S&B). These two municipalities 
have a combined area of 27,285km2. The database was later extended to the neighboring 
municipalities outside of S&B (96,256 km2) in order to cover farmers outside of S&B 
that supply soybeans to the Santarém terminal (Cleary 2007). The initial assessment was 
used to create a map showing stands of primary forest in S&B as well as farm locations. 
Updated maps were completed in May 2007 and December 2008. Since then the map has 
been updated annually. 
 
III. Model 
 
In this section, I develop a simple three period profit maximization model to explain 
farmers’ production and deforestation decisions for a case like that in the Santarém area. 
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Let  ≥ 0 denote the proportion of land deforested by farmer i in period t and let  
represent the cumulative deforestation in period t:  =  ∑ 	 . Assume initial 
deforestation is given by 
. I assume there is a constant cost of deforestation per unit 
area, CD. Farmer i’s agricultural production function in period t, (), is a function of 
the proportion of area in cultivation,  ≤ . The production costs of farmer i in period t 
is given by (). Assume that both the production function and cost function are twice 
differentiable with:  
Assumption 1. (. ) is increasing and concave (f′ > 0, ′′ < 0)  
Assumption 2. (. ) is increasing and convex (C > 0, C ≥ 0) 
As long as net revenue of agricultural production does not decline through time, a profit 
maximizing farmer will set the proportion of area of cultivation equal to the cumulative 
amount of deforestation,  = .  I assume this condition holds in what follows.  
In period 1, farmers can only sell agricultural output to firm 1. Firm 1 may be 
thought of as a local buyer that pays a low price and does not impose environmental 
standards on farmers. Let  	 be the price paid by firm 1 per unit of production.  Firm 2 
enters in period 2. Firm 2 may be thought of as a multinational company that exports 
agricultural output. In period 3, firm 2 introduces a strict environmental standard and will 
only buy from farmers who do not engage in deforestation in period 3 (deforestation that 
occurs before the standard is put in place in period 1 and 2 is not restricted). Let   be 
the price paid by firm 2 per unit of production, with  > 	 .  The transportation cost per 
unit of agricultural products sold by farmer i to firm j is Cij. Depending on price and 
transport cost farmer i will sell to firm 1 if P	-C	 ≥ P-C, and sell to firm 2 otherwise. 
Let  δ  be the discount factor between time periods. Suppose that farmers do not 
anticipate future entry of firm 2 or strict environmental standards, either because they are 
myopic or because they do not have access to information about such future changes.  
The case with fully informed farmers generates qualitatively similar results in terms of 
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the pattern of deforestation across periods and will not be discussed here.  In period 1 
each farmer expects to sell agricultural products in periods 1, 2, and 3 with production 
and cost functions defined above.  A farmer solves the following profit maximization 
problem to decide how much forest to clear and how much to produce:   
max$%&  ' ( )*	
+
	 [(	 − 	)() − () − $] 
With constant marginal costs of deforestation, a farmer will plan on clearing land for 
production in period 1 and not in periods 2 and 3 since clearing in period 1 allows 
production in all periods while clearing later foregoes production in earlier periods. Let 
	∗ represent the profit maximizing choice of deforestation for farmer i.  The farmer will 
produce on all cleared land with production of 0	∗ 1 and anticipated net revenue in 
each period of '2(	 − 	)0	∗ 1 − 0	∗ 1 − $	3, with 	 = 	∗ ,  = + = 0.   
In period 2, farmers now realize they have the option of selling to firm 2. Farmers 
now solve the following problem:  
max$%8 ( )*
+
 [(9 − 9)() − () − $] 
Farmers will find it profitable to clear more land in period 2 as long as expected marginal 
profit from selling to firm 2, evaluated at 	∗ is positive: 
' ( )*[( − ) :0	∗1:	 − :0
	∗1:	 − $]
+
 > 0 
Farmers selling to firm 2 may find it profitable to deforest in period 2 because  − C > 	 −  C	.  Farmers selling to firm 1 will not engage in deforestation. In period 3, farmers 
cannot deforest to sell to firm 2 and there will be no further deforestation. However, even 
without a ban on deforestation, neither farmers selling to firm 1 nor to firm 2 would find 
it profitable to engage in further deforestation in period 3. The environmental standard 
imposed by firm 2 in period 3 to prevent further deforestation has no impact on 
deforestation behavior of farmers.  
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Based on this simple model, I would expect that farmers enrolled in the 
Responsible Soy Project (those who sell to Cargill) would engage in deforestation after 
the port opens (period 2) and cease to deforest after the project begins (period 3).  
Farmers who do not enroll in the project (those who sell produce locally) would not be 
expected to deforest in either time period 2 or 3. The environmental standard imposed in 
period 3 has no impact on the pattern of deforestation.   
 
IV. Empirical Model 
 
The Responsible Soy Project is a non-randomized experiment because farmers choose 
whether to register their properties in the project. Farmer and property characteristics that 
make a farmer more likely to enroll in the project may be correlated with the 
deforestation rate on the property. Unobservable characteristics that are correlated with 
the participation decision and deforestation rates, such as a farmer’s attitudes towards the 
environment, or the profitability of growing soybeans for export, can bias regression 
results (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). I use matching, difference-in-differences (DID), 
and matching-DID methods to deal with the endogeneity problem and estimate the 
impact of the project on deforestation. Matching, DID, and the combination of those two 
methods have been widely used in recent years to evaluate the impact of environmental 
policies and projects (e.g., Andam et al. 2008; Honey-Roses et al. 2011; Nelson and 
Chomitz 2011; Robalino and Pfaff 2013).  
One of the challenges in using matching and DID methods in the context of the 
Responsible Soy Project is that there are two events that have impact on deforestation 
rates: the opening of the port in 2003 and the start of the project in 2005. I first estimate 
whether there was an impact of the opening of the port facility on deforestation rates in 
2003 and 2004. I then estimate the impact of the Responsible Soy Project on 
deforestation rates in 2005 – 2012. I assume that the deforestation rates in 2003 and 2004 
were not affected by the project announcement. The Brazilian National Institute for 
Space Research (INPE) annually records deforestation in the Amazon starting from 
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August of that year to July of the following year. The announcement of the Responsible 
Soy Project in June 2005 might have impacted deforestation in June and July of 2005, 
which were recorded as deforestation in 2004 by INPE. However, I assume that the 
amount of deforestation in those two months would be minimal compared to 
deforestation in other months given that the months of June and July belong to the wet 
season and farmers burn down the forest to deforest in many cases within the study area. 
 
Nearest Neighbor Covariate Matching Method  
In matching methods, each observation in the treatment group is matched with 
one or more observations in the control group that have similar observable 
characteristics. I match each observation in the treatment group (P = 1) to observations 
in the control group (P = 0) based on an observed set of variables, Z. I first use four 
matching covariates to measure the impact of the port facility opening on deforestation of 
the treatment group between 2003 and 2004. The four matching covariates are distance to 
the nearest major roads, distance to the soybean delivery facility, soil quality, and total 
property area. These four covariates are chosen based on the theoretical model ad 
availability of the data. Given there is no price difference among farmers selling to the 
same firm in this region, each farmer’s production and deforestation decisions depend on 
factors affecting yield and cost. Distance variables and total property area affect 
transportation and production costs and soil quality affects yield of crops. I then use the 
same four covariates plus the deforestation rates in 2003 and 2004 to measure the impact 
of the Responsible Soy Project on deforestation between 2005 and 2012. These six 
variables are used to find the nearest neighbors to match each property in the treatment 
group to one or more properties in the control group.  
 I match properties in the treatment group based on observed variables both to 
their single nearest neighbor and to their four1 nearest neighbors (Abadie and Imbens, 
2011). The inverse of the variances of each element in Z is used for the distance metric. I 
                                                 
1 Abadie and Imbens (2011) suggest using four nearest neighbors because the model with 
four neighbors performed better with less mean-squared error in their simulation. 
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correct for bias that remains after matching by adjusting the differences in matched 
control and treatment properties for the differences in covariates (Abadie and Imbens 
2011; Abadie et al. 2004). I estimate heteroskedastic-robust asymptotic variance (Abadie 
and Imbens 2006; Abadie et al. 2004) because the bootstrap standard error method is not 
valid for nearest neighbor matching using a fixed number of neighbors with replacement 
(Abadie and Imbens 2008). The heteroskedasticity assumption relaxes the assumption of 
constant variance conditional on treatment and covariates, Z.       
 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) Method 
The DID method is useful for disentangling the impacts of a specific project that affects 
only those participating in a project from more general trends that affect everyone. The 
DID estimator controls for unobserved time-invariant farmer characteristics that affect 
selection in the project participation by double differencing. It takes differences in the 
pre- and post-project deforestation rates within control and treatment groups, and takes 
differences again between control and treatment groups. The DID is estimated using the 
following regression (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009): < = = + ? + @	A + B$C$A + )D + E 
where < is the deforestation rate of property i at time period t;  is a time dummy 
variable which is 1 if  t ≥ 2005 and 0, otherwise; A is a participation dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the property is eventually in the project and 0 otherwise; D is a vector of 
other control variables that affect the deforestation rate in property i including land 
quality, previous year’s average revenue per hectare from crop production, total property 
area, distance to the soybean delivery facility, and distance to major roads; and ε is an 
error term that is assumed to be independent of both G and D. The initial time period 2001 ≤ I ≤ 2004 and control group of A = 0 coefficients have implicitly been 
normalized to zero. This model assumes that the policy effect is the same for all years.  
The resulting coefficient, B$C$, estimates the difference in the average outcome of 
the treatment group before and after the treatment minus the difference in the average 
outcome of the control group before and after the treatment. This double-differencing 
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method controls for the time trend and differences in < caused by time-invariant 
characteristics and thus isolates the effect of project participation on deforestation.  
I use a robust clustered variance-covariance matrix. Bertrand et al. (2004) show 
that serial autocorrelation can lead to overestimated t-statistics and significance levels. 
The robust clustered variance-covariance matrix clusters all observations in different 
years by property and corrects for serial autocorrelation.  
 
Matching-DID method 
I combine matching and DID estimation methods to control for both observable and time-
invariant unobservable characteristics that can affect project participation decisions 
(Heckman et al. 1997,1998). I use kernel-based propensity score matching-DID. I first 
estimate the probability of participating in the project, i.e., the propensity score, which is 
used as a weight to account for the relative proximity of the control group to the 
treatment group. The weighted average of deforestation rates of the control group using 
the relative propensity score of the control group to that of the treatment group as a 
weight is compared to that of the treatment group by double differencing as explained in 
the DID Method section. I perform DID on the common support of the propensity score 
after matching and use clustered robust standard errors as I have used them for the 
covariate matching method.  
In using the DID and matching-DID estimators, I control for the opening of the 
port facility. Ignoring the opening of the port might cause bias in evaluating the impact of 
the project and violate the “parallel trend” assumption that needs to be satisfied in using 
the DID method. I estimate the DID estimator using all years as well as excluding the 
years 2003 and 2004 when there is a significant difference in deforestation rates between 
control and treatment groups (Ashenfelter 1978). I assume that 2003 and 2004 is when 
the effect of the opening of the port facility might have had different effects on the 
treatment and control groups. Matching-DID method estimates DID using only matched 
observations based on all covariates including deforestation rates in 2003 and 2004. This 
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approach also controls for the different effect of the port facility opening on treatment 
and control groups before the start of the Responsible Soy Project. 
 
V. Data 
 
Constructing Variables 
The deforestation rate in each year is calculated for the properties in the control and 
treatment groups. Data on deforestation from 2001 to 2012 come from the Brazilian 
National Institute for Space Research (INPE). The deforestation rate on each property is 
defined as the percentage of deforested area during time I over the remaining forest cover 
at time I − 1. In this dataset, only properties with more than 6.25 hectares of forest cover 
are recorded as having forest cover, which is the minimum area that can be detected 
through satellite imagery system.  
ArcMap GIS software was used to create property polygons from property 
boundary information and to calculate the other control variables, including the total area 
of each property, distance to soybean delivery facility, distance to the nearest major 
roads, and land quality variables. Data on individual property boundaries come from 
TNC for the treatment group, and from the Environmental Registry System (CAR) of the 
Pará State Environmental Agency (SEMA) for the control group (SEMA 2012). Distance 
to Cargill’s soybean delivery facility and distance to the nearest major roads are 
calculated from the coordinates of Cargill’s soybean delivery facility and from road shape 
files from Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa 2013). Distances are 
measured as the length of a straight line from a point to the nearest edge of a feature. 
Land quality is calculated for each farm by assigning proportional area weights using 
data from Embrapa (Embrapa 2013). The description of variables used in the model and 
summary statistics are given in Table 1-1.  
The average revenue from crop production is represented as 2010 US dollar 
values calculated by using data from Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE 2015) adjusted by GDP deflator and purchasing power parity from World Bank 
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(World Bank 2012a 2012b). Total revenue from temporary crops, which are sown and 
harvested during the same agricultural year, is divided by total temporary crop harvested 
area to calculate the average per hectare revenue from crop production. I use previous 
year’s average revenue in each year assuming that farmers use previous year’s 
information on prices for their current decisions on deforestation and crop production. 
 
Constructing Treatment and Control Groups 
The treatment group is defined as properties participating in the Responsible Soy Project, 
while the control group is defined as properties not participating in the project but within 
the municipalities of Santarém and Belterra (S&B).  
I exclude properties with zero recorded forest cover in any given year because the 
focus of this study is on deforestation (with no forest there is no possible deforestation).  
In the treatment group, 65 of 383 properties had no forest cover. I also excluded 15 
properties after 2008 and 8 properties after 2010 that were dropped from the project 
because they failed to meet project criteria. Finally, I restrict the analysis to farms that 
were in the project since its implementation in 2005 which results in an additional 40 
farms being dropped because they did not join the project until 2011-2012. To check the 
robustness of the results, I also run the analysis including the 23 properties that were 
dropped from the project and the 40 properties that entered the project in 2011-2012 and 
found that the main findings were robust to different inclusion and exclusion 
assumptions.  
For the control group, I downloaded boundary files of farms in S&B, located east 
of the Tapajós and south of Amazon rivers, where the farms in the treatment group are 
located to minimize bias that can occur because of geographic mismatch (Heckman et al 
1997; 1998). In addition, I used only farms that have been reviewed and confirmed by 
SEMA. There are 235 properties in the control group. 
I test for covariate balance before and after matching and find that matching 
improves covariate balance between control and treatment groups. Table 1-2 shows the 
mean of covariates, significance of the differences in the mean of covariates, and 
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percentage of the bias between control and treatment groups before and after matching. 
On average, properties in the treatment group tend to be closer to the soybean delivery 
facility and to major roads, have larger total area, and have better land quality compared 
to the properties in the control group. The differences between the means of covariates in 
the treatment and control groups are all significant at 10% level of significance except the 
total area variable. The significant differences between the mean of covariates in the 
treatment and control groups disappear after matching. The results in Table 1-2 also show 
that the percentage of the bias is reduced significantly, which indicates an improvement 
in balance between the treatment and control groups. The percentage of the bias is 
calculated as the percentage difference of the sample means in the treatment and control 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in 
the treatment and control groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985).  
 
VI. Results 
 
The main environmental question of interest is the effect of the Responsible Soy Project 
on deforestation. I first present evidence using descriptive statistics and then present 
econometric estimates using DID and matching methods. 
 
Evidence from Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics show that deforestation increased dramatically in 2003 and 2004 
following the opening of the port facility and then fell dramatically in 2005 at the time of 
start of the Responsible Soy Project and have remained low since (Figure 1-2).   
The opening of the port in 2003 appeared to push deforestation rates higher in the 
S&B region, especially for the treatment group, and to increase the production of 
soybeans in the region. Deforestation rates increased dramatically in 2003 and 2004, the 
period after the port opened but before the project began. The average deforestation rate 
of the treatment group increased 311% from 2002 to 2003 and 170% from 2003 to 2004. 
The average deforestation rate of the control group increased 145% from 2002 to 2003 
and 38% from 2003 to 2004. Figure 1-3 shows the percentage of land planted with 
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soybeans over total cropland area for S&B, the surrounding municipalities,2 Pará state, 
and Brazil, from 2001 to 2011. The percentage of crop land planted with soybeans in 
S&B increased from just 0.9% in 2002 to 28.1% in 2005. In Brazil as a whole, the 
percentage of crop land planted with soybeans increased from 30% in 2002 to 36.4% in 
2005. The significant increase in land planted with soybeans in S&B between 2003 and 
2005 is consistent with the fact that the new port opened up opportunities for producing 
and exporting soybeans from the area. Following 2005, soybean percentages have stayed 
relatively unchanged in both S&B and in Brazil as a whole. 
Deforestation rates decreased significantly in 2005 for both control and treatment 
groups with a greater decrease in the treatment group. With the beginning of the 
Responsible Soy Project in 2005, the rate of deforestation in the treatment group dropped 
and has remained relatively low thereafter; the average deforestation rate dropped from 
17.8% in 2004 to 1.7% in 2005. However, deforestation rates also dropped in the control 
group starting in 2005 though the decline was not as dramatic as in the treatment group 
(from 5.8% in 2004 to 2.3% in 2005). Since 2006, the average deforestation rate has been 
relatively steady with a decreasing trend for both the treatment and control groups. The 
average deforestation rate was slightly higher in the treatment group than in the control 
group between 2007 and 2010. Since 2011, the deforestation rate in the treatment group 
has been lower compared to that of the control group.  
It is not clear whether the large decrease in deforestation rates after 2005 in the 
treatment group shows the positive impact of the Responsible Soy Project in reducing 
deforestation or whether it is a reversion to a more typical deforestation following 
elevated deforestation rates as a result of the opening of the port facility. It is possible 
that without the project there would have been continued high rates of deforestation after 
2005 because of profitable opportunities to produce soybeans given the existence of the 
port facility. Yet this evidence is also consistent with the view that the deforestation that 
                                                 
2 Surrounding 10 municipalities include Alenquer, Aveiro, Curuá, Juruti, Monte Alegre, Óbidos, 
Placas, Prainha, Rurópolis, and Uruará. The total area of these 10 municipalities is 136,443 km2, 
making it 5 times larger than the combined area of S&B. 
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was going to occur with the opening of the port largely occurred in 2003 and 2004 and 
would have dropped in any event soon thereafter. The decline in deforestation after 2005 
may also have been the result of changes in federal policies, such as increased 
enforcement of the Forest Code by the government, or changes in international 
agricultural markets, such as the drop in the price of soybeans in 2005. The real price of 
soybeans dropped by 13%, and that of maize dropped by 14%, from 2004 to 2005 (World 
Bank 2013). However, prices of crops increased in the years following without an 
increase in deforestation rates.  
The following subsection further investigates which hypothesis best describes the 
impact of the port and the project by using matching, DID and matching-DID methods. 
 
Evidence from empirical models 
Results from DID and matching methods show positive impact of the port facility 
opening on deforestation but ambiguous impact of the Responsible Soy Project.  
The matching estimator results from Table 1-3 shows that the treatment group had 
higher deforestation rates in 2004 while there is not much significant differences in 
deforestation rates between control and treatment groups between 2005 and 2012 after 
the Responsible Soy Project started. The positive and significant parameters of 7.9% and 
8.5% using one and four nearest neighbors, respectively, indicate that the treatment group 
had significantly higher deforestation rates than the control group in 2004. After 2005 
when the Responsible Soy Project began both treatment and control groups had similar 
deforestation rates, i.e., no significant differences, except for the year 2008 and 2011, 
where there were statistically significant positive and negative coefficients, respectively. 
The DID and matching-DID methods also show similar results for the impact of 
the Responsible Soy Project. The key coefficient in the DID regression is the coefficient 
on the Project time period*Treatment variable (shown in Table 1-4). This variable 
measures the difference in the effect of the project on deforestation rates of the treatment 
and control groups. A negative coefficient indicates that the project is correlated with a 
decrease in deforestation. The results using data from all years indicate a negative and 
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significant coefficient of Project time period*Treatment variable (Column 2 of Table 1-
4). However, when the DID regression is run without 2004, which is the year that 
deforestation rates are significantly different between control and treatment groups after 
the port facility opening, the significant impact of the project disappears (Project time 
period*Treatment variable in Column 3 of Table 1-4). The insignificant impact of the 
project after exclusion of 2004 observations from DID shows that the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient is due almost entirely to the high rates of deforestation 
in the treatment group in 2004 (as shown in Figure 1-2). 
Similar results are found using the matching-DID method. The significant impact 
of the project disappears when I use deforestation in 2003 and 2004 as matching 
covariates along with other observable characteristics (Project time period*Treatment 
variable in Column 4 and 5 of Table 1-4). The sign of the variable is negative but it is not 
significant either at 5% or at 10%. Matching-DID method compares control and 
treatment groups that have similar distance to the soybean delivery facility and major 
roads, total area, land quality, and deforestation rate in 2003 and 2004 and difference out 
time-invariant factors that affect deforestation and program participation decisions. 
Specifically, the inclusion of deforestation rate in 2003 and 2004 as matching covariates 
supports the parallel trend assumption and enables us to compare control and treatment 
groups that are likely to have similar deforestation rates in 2003 and 2004. This allows us 
to assume that this matched control group would have had similar deforestation rates as 
the treatment group had there not been the Responsible Soy Project. The negative sign 
shows that there may have been some impact from the project. However, this coefficient 
is not statistically significantly different from no effect.  
The regression results from the DID method in Table 1-4 also show how physical 
characteristics and crop prices affect deforestation rates. Properties that are closer to the 
soybean delivery facility, have higher quality land, and with larger total area tend to have 
higher deforestation rates. Previous year’s higher average revenue from crop production 
is associated with high deforestation rates. It is intuitive that properties closer to the 
soybean delivery facility or with high quality land would tend to have higher 
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deforestation rates as this makes agricultural production more profitable, but it is less 
clear why large properties also tend to have higher deforestation rates. The total area 
variable was included for consistency between the DID estimator and matching 
estimators. The main results do not change with exclusion of the total area variable. The 
distance to a major road is statistically insignificant. Most of the properties in the region 
are fairly close to federal and state roads, which may explain why this variable does not 
appear to be much of a factor. These results hold using data from all years and excluding 
the year 2004. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Thoughtful economic development coupled with enforcement of environmental laws to 
protect natural capital offers the best hope for achieving a decent standard of living for all 
people while maintaining the natural capital on which future prosperity depends. Often 
some type of government regulation is needed to achieve an efficient level of 
development and conservation because of environmental externalities. In many cases, 
however, especially in developing countries, governmental regulations fail to achieve 
desired goals due to lack of monitoring and enforcement. An alternative route to 
monitoring and enforcement is to engage the private sector and NGOs to help with 
enforcement. In this paper, I used data from The Responsible Soy Project, a pilot project 
between Cargill and TNC to prevent deforestation from soybean production, to evaluate 
whether this type of partnership can have a positive impact on environmental outcomes. 
I found that there was a spike in deforestation in 2003-2004 when the port facility 
opened, especially in the treatment group. There was also an extensive expansion of 
soybean planted area during these years. After the Responsible Soy Project was 
implemented, deforestation rates declined, especially in the treatment group, but it is not 
clear whether or not this is a result of the Responsible Soy Project. Just comparing the 
period after 2005 with the period before 2005 (including 2004), I find that there is a 
statistically significant negative effect of the project on deforestation rates.  However, 
when 2004 is dropped from the analysis, the effect of the project is still negative but it 
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becomes statistically insignificant. The larger decline in deforestation rates after 2005 in 
the treatment group compared to the control group may be simply a reversion to more 
typical deforestation rates following elevated deforestation in 2004. The nearest neighbor 
matching methods showed that deforestation rates of the treated group are not statistically 
significantly different from the control group after the implementation of the Responsible 
Soy Project, with exceptions in 2008 and 2011. The matching-DID method suggested that 
there may have been positive impact of the project on decreasing deforestation, as shown 
by the negative sign, but it is not statistically significant.  
What is clear from these results is the importance of timing. To prevent 
environmentally unsustainable activities from occurring, projects to monitor and enforce 
environmental laws must be in place prior to proceeding with economic development that 
presents opportunities for environmentally destructive outcomes rather than being put in 
place after such activity is already underway.  The simple theoretical model showed that 
a project such as the Responsible Soy Project will not have a beneficial environmental 
impact if it is implemented after opportunities for environmentally destructive activities 
have occurred in the field. Land owners adjust their production decisions when they are 
given economic incentives to do so. Enforcing strict regulation to prevent deforestation 
only after deforestation has occurred is too late.  
In other respects, there is some evidence of positive effects of the project but 
these may be harder to quantify. Through a visit to the project properties and a series of 
semi-structured interviews with farmers, governmental officials, and TNC and Cargill 
staffs, I found that the project increased farmers’ knowledge of the Forest Code and 
improved the means for compliance. The project has had success in forging relationships 
among important stakeholder groups and in demonstrating techniques for registering 
land, monitoring and enforcement of the Forest Code. The amount of deforestation in 
Brazil as a whole has declined significantly after 2004 when deforestation was the second 
highest it had been since 1988 when the annual record began. While it is unclear how 
much this project can claim as success it is clear that enforcement and monitoring have 
improved and deforestation has declined in recent years.   
 21 
 
The business environment in Brazil and other countries has been changing 
significantly, with governments’ increased efforts to enforce environmental regulations 
and consumers who are increasingly willing to purchase environmentally sustainable 
products (Pickett-Baker and Ozaki 2008). Multinational businesses and local farmers 
respond to changes in the market. A partnership such as that between Cargill and TNC, 
demonstrated in the Responsible Soy Project, can change incentives and produce results 
on the ground. The project provides an example of how a multinational corporation and 
an international conservation NGO can address the issue of environmental degradation in 
the process of economic development using market incentives and involving all 
stakeholders. With further attention to issues of timing as well as other important details 
of the project design, such projects have the potential to achieve both economic 
development and environmental conservation goals. 
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Table 1-1. Variable descriptions, means, and standard deviations (S.D.)  
Variable Description 
Mean (S.D.) 
Total 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
(N=553) (N=235) (N=318) 
Deforestation rate in 
each year between 
2001 and 2012 (%) 
The percentage of deforested 
area over remaining forest 
cover  
   
Deforestation in 
2003 (%) 
The percentage of deforested 
area over remaining forest 
cover in 2003 
5.56 
(15.29) 
4.17 
(12.41) 
6.58 
(17.06) 
Distance to the 
soybean delivery 
facility (km) 
Euclidean distance from a 
property to Cargill’s soybean 
delivery facility 
49.22 
(25.04) 
52.20 
(23.37) 
47.01 
(26.02) 
Distance to a major 
road (km) 
Euclidean distance from a 
property to the nearest 
federal or state road 
4.37 
(5.47) 
6.45 
(7.07) 
2.84 
(3.10) 
Total area (ha) Total area of a property 379.48 
(676.35) 
369.68 
(447.87) 
386.72 
(805.22) 
Land quality Area-weighted land quality 
based on the classification of 
Ramalho and Pereira (1995). 
Scores range from 0 (no 
production capability) to 7 
(most productive soil)  
5.23 
(1.89) 
4.60 
(2.09) 
5.70 
(1.58) 
Average revenue 
per hectare from 
crop production 
(2010 US $/ha) 
Total revenue from 
temporary crop production 
divided by total harvested 
area in the municipalities of 
Santarém and Belterra 
1,447.25 
(370.57) 
1,447.25 
(370.57) 
1,447.25 
(370.57) 
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Table 1-2. Covariate balance and bias between treatment and control groups before and after matching  
Variable 
Unmatched  Matched 
Mean  
t-test % bias 
 Mean 
t-test % bias 
Change in % 
bias (%) 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
 
Control 
group 
Deforestation rate in 
2003 (%) 
6.58 
 
4.17 1.84* 16.2 
 
5.54 
 
0.80 6.3 -61 
Deforestation rate in 
2004 (%) 
17.78 5.76 5.58*** 49.8 15.88 0.82 6.5 -87 
Distance to the 
soybean delivery 
facility (km) 
47.01 
 
52.20 
 
-2.42** -21  46.46 0.28 2.2 -110 
Distance to a major 
road (km) 
2.84 
 
6.45 
 
-8.11*** -66.1  2.46 1.59 12.6 -119 
Total area (ha) 386.72 
 
369.68 
 
0.29 2.6  315.17 1.31 10.4 300 
Land quality 5.70 
 
4.60 
 
7.08*** 59.7  5.68 0.14 1.1 -98 
***, **, and * indicate 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively 
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Table 1-3. The nearest neighbor matching estimator results on the impact of the port 
facility and of the Responsible Soy Project 
Year 
Average Effect on the Treated  
Impact of the Port Facility Impact of the Project 
one neighbor 
(S.E) 
four neighbors 
(S.E) 
one neighbor 
(S.E) 
four neighbors 
(S.E) 
2003 -0.35 
(1.83) 
0.89 
(1.48) 
  
2004 7.89*** 
(2.92) 
8.53*** 
(2.46) 
  
2005   0.27 
(1.28) 
-0.27  
(1.12) 
2006   -3.33 
(2.39) 
-1.36 
(1.61) 
2007   0.63 
(0.67) 
0.96  
(0.59) 
2008   1.42** 
(0.65) 
1.00  
(0.73) 
2009   -2.12 
(1.59) 
-1.90  
(1.73) 
2010   -1.86 
(2.66) 
-2.05  
(1.78) 
2011   -5.20* 
(2.79) 
-5.39**  
(2.11) 
2012   -0.93 
(1.23) 
-0.69  
(1.01) 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively, using standard errors adjusted 
for individual property  
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Table 1-4. Difference-in-differences (DID) and matching-DID regression results for the 
effect of the Responsible Soy Project on deforestation with all years and without 2004 
observations 
Variables 
DID Matching-DID 
2001-2012 
(S.E) 
Without  
2004 
(S.E) 
2001-2012 
(S.E) 
Intercept 
-3.46*** 
(0.84) 
1.29*** 
(0.69) 
  
Distance to the soybean 
delivery facility 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
  
Distance to a major 
road 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
  
Total area (100ha) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  
Land quality 
0.37*** 
(0.08) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
  
Average revenue from 
crop production ($100) 
0.57*** 
(0.06) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
  
Project time period  
-2.96*** 
(0.50) 
-1.22** 
(0.54) 
  
Treatment 
2.82*** 
(0.68) 
0.22 
(0.56) 
  
Project time 
period*Treatment 
-3.65*** 
(0.70) 
-0.73 
(0.61) 
-1.48 
(1.08) 
***, **, and * indicate 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively 
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Figure 1-1. The location of Cargill soybean export facility in Santarém near the 
confluence of the Amazon and Tapajós Rivers in northern Brazil 
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Figure 1-2. Comparison of the average percentage of deforested land over the remaining 
forest area in the control group and in the treatment group by year from 2001 to 2012 
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Figure 1-3. Percentage of soybean planted area over total cropland area in Brazil, Pará, 
S&B, and surrounding municipalities 
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Chapter 2. How Much Did We Lose/Gain As A Result of Soybean 
Export Facility Opening in the Amazon? 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Brazilian Amazon is important for both conservation and development. The region 
has rich biodiversity and carbon storage that are of global significance, and at the same 
time it has the highest poverty rate of any region in Brazil. The Amazon is the largest 
tropical rainforest in the world and stores vast amounts of carbon. However, as of 2013 
about 15% of total legal Amazon area had been deforested through agricultural 
expansion, leading to a massive release of carbon and loss of biodiversity. Agricultural 
expansion in the Brazilian Amazon has generated income and employment and has 
contributed to the economic development of the region.  Still, many people remain in 
poverty: the average poverty rate in Pará state between 2011 and 2013 was 24% (IPEA 
2015).  
Efficient land-use planning requires estimation of the impacts from new economic 
incentives and the resulting tradeoffs among ecosystem services. The estimation of 
impacts and tradeoffs can be used for benefit/cost analyses to find efficient practices that 
maximize net benefits from conservation and/or development. Failure to estimate the 
impacts of changes in economic incentives and resulting tradeoffs will likely lead to 
inefficient land use decisions. Many past development strategies have generated 
inefficient results because they have not utilized accurate values of ecosystem services 
(Balmford et al. 2002; MEA 2005). The estimation of impacts and tradeoffs is 
particularly important in many developing countries because they have high value of 
ecosystem services and people depend directly on natural resources for food and income. 
Impact assessments of new economic incentives and estimation of the resulting tradeoff 
value of ecosystem services will contribute to efficient land use decisions that can 
provide both income for the local people as well as a variety of ecosystem services, such 
as carbon sequestration. 
 30 
 
In this paper, I investigate the impact of the opening of a new soybean export 
facility on the amount of deforestation and the resulting tradeoff between agricultural 
production and carbon sequestration in the Santarém area. In 2003, the agricultural 
multinational company Cargill opened a soybean export facility in Santarém, located on 
the confluence of the Amazon and Tapajos Rivers (Figure 2-1) within the northern region 
of the Brazilian Amazon. I first estimate the impact of the opening of the port facility 
opening on deforestation. I then construct a counterfactual land-use land-cover map using 
estimation results to compare the tradeoff between agricultural production and carbon 
sequestration. I also calculate the break-even price of carbon needed to compensate 
farmers for their lost profit from agricultural production if the land were preserved.   
I find that the average deforestation rate increased from 1.52% in 2002 to 5.48% 
in 2003 and 11.70% in 2004. The increase in deforestation is equivalent to 164 km2. The 
comparison of the value of the reduction in carbon storage to increased agricultural 
production depends on the discount rate and the social cost of carbon (IWG 2015). Using 
a 3% discount rate and a social cost of carbon of $40 per ton of CO2, the value of the lost 
carbon in the study area exceeds the value of the increased agricultural production. At a 
5% discount rate, the value of the loss in carbon storage is less than the agricultural value. 
I also find that the break-even price of carbon to compensate farmers for their loss of 
agricultural profit is $92.4 and $55.4 per ton of carbon, assuming 3% and 5% discount 
rates, respectively. The results suggest that careful consideration of benefits and costs 
prior to the opening of the port facility might have increased the net benefits from these 
ecosystem services. Considering other ecosystem services, such as water purification, 
would increase the value of conservation relative to development. These estimates of the 
break-even price of carbon provide quantitative estimates of how much farmers should be 
compensated if Brazil were to preserve those lands to increase net benefits from various 
ecosystem services. 
In the conservation and land-use planning literature, impact evaluation studies 
have used program evaluation methods to quantitatively measure the amount of avoided 
deforestation as a result of conservation programs. Blackman (2013) provides a good 
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review of ex-post analyses of the impact of various forest conservation policies such as 
protected areas (PA) and payment for ecosystem services (PES). However, most of these 
studies do not consider other associated costs or benefits from conservation programs 
such as the cost of implementing the conservation project or the benefits of conservation 
on ecosystem services. Ignoring the associated costs and benefits from conservation 
programs can be misleading because the marginal costs and benefits of additional forest 
cover spatially vary significantly (Vincent 2015).  
This study contributes to the land use planning literature by evaluating the impact 
of the opening of a port facility on deforestation and the resulting tradeoff between 
agricultural production and carbon sequestration. It bridges the gap between the impact 
evaluation and the tradeoff of ecosystem services’ analysis (e.g., Koh and Ghazoul 2010; 
Goldstein et al. 2012) literature by translating the change in deforestation resulting from 
the port facility opening into the change in the value of carbon and agricultural 
production.  
This study can inform policies for efficient land use that promote both economic 
development for the poor and the provision of ecosystem services. It will lead to better 
land-use decisions not only for governments but also for other stakeholders, including 
private companies and global initiatives such as United Nation’s program on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. The following sections proceed 
with background of the deforestation in the Santarém and Belterra region, empirical 
estimation methods, and regression estimation results, followed by conclusions.  
 
II. Background 
 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon and in the municipalities of Santarém and 
Belterra 
The cumulative cleared forest area in the Brailian Amazon in 2010 was 742,782 km2, 
which is about 14% of the total Legal Amazon area in Brazil and is bigger than the size 
of Texas (696,241 km2). The history of major deforestation goes back to 1970s and 
1980s, when there were both land speculation and tax and subsidy incentives to clear 
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forest for large-scale cattle ranching (Fearnside 2005). The deforestation rate peaked in 
1995. The peak in land clearing occurred during an economic recovery following a 
successful currency reform, Plano Real, in 1994. The deforestation rate declined from 
1995 to 1997 but increased from 1997 to 2004 largely due to increased deforestation in 
the states of Mato Grosso, Rondônia, and Pará (Macedo et al. 2012) for cattle ranching 
and crop production. Since 2004 the deforestation rate has been declining as a result of 
various factors such as a stronger Brazilian currency, increased enforcement of 
regulations from the Brazilian government, and increased engagement of private 
companies in reducing deforestation. Focusing on Santarém, the history of major 
deforestation dates from the 1970s, when black pepper plantations were developed and 
the government started to construct transportation infrastructure. The cumulative 
deforestation rate in the municipality of Santarém was 16% (3,756 km2) in 2000, and it 
had reached 20% (4,586 km2) in 2010. 
To a certain extent the pattern of deforestation around Santarém and Belterra 
(S&B) area is reflected in the patterns for Amazon as a whole as is shown in the Figure 2-
2. This figure presents the annual deforestation rate over the remaining forest cover in the 
Amazon, in Pará state, and in the two municipalities of S&B and the surrounding 10 
municipalities3. The Amazon, Pará state, and S&B and the surrounding municipalities all 
have decreasing trends, with some fluctuations from 2001 to 2011. It appears that the 
deforestation patterns of Amazon and Pará state were similar. Pará state has had the 
highest deforestation rate compared to other regions during this period. The deforestation 
rate pattern in the S&B and surrounding 10 municipalities was different from that of the 
other regions between 2002 and 2004, which is around the time when Cargill opened the 
soybean export facility in 2003. The rate increased by 145% in the S&B and surrounding 
10 municipalities, which is more than four times and seven times higher than that 
increase in Pará state (32%) and in the Amazon area (20%), respectively. The differences 
                                                 
3 The surrounding 10 municipalities are Alenquer, Aveiro, Curuá, Juruti, Monte Alegre, Óbidos, 
Placas, Prainha, Rurópolis, and Uruará, which surround the municipalities of S&B. The total area 
of these 10 municipalities is 136,443 km2, making it 5 times larger than the combined area of 
S&B. 
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in these deforestation rates have become smaller in more recent years, while the 
deforestation rates have become relatively higher in S&B and the surrounding 10 
municipalities relative to other regions after 2006.  
 
Soybean Export Facility Opening in the municipality of Santarém 
The soybean expansion in the municipality of Santarém is primarily due to the soybean 
export facility opening in 2003 by Cargill. Cargill opened a soybean export facility at the 
port in Santarém (Figure 2-1) to avoid congestion in the southern port of Santos and to 
decrease transportation cost. Since then, production of soybeans has increased in the 
region; the percentage of soybean planted area over total crop planted area changed from 
1% in 2002 to 28% in 2005 in Santarém and Belterra (IBGE 2015).  
 
III. Methods 
 
I model changes in two ecosystem services, i.e., agricultural production and carbon 
sequestration, as a result of the opening of the soybean export facility in Santarém in 
2003. The analysis is composed of two parts: 1) Regression analysis on the impact of the 
soybean export facility opening on deforestation and 2) Estimation of the tradeoff 
between the value of agricultural production and carbon sequestration using the results 
from the regression analysis. 
 I estimate a regression to measure the impact of the new soybean export facility 
opening on deforestation in the region of S&B using two different estimation methods. 
The first method, year specific effects on deforestation, estimates whether there is any 
year between 2001 and 2010 that has higher deforestation than the other years. The 
results from this first regression give a general idea of which years the port opening 
potentially had a significant impact on deforestation. Then, I run difference-in-
diffearences (DID) regression to measure the impact of the port facility opening on 
deforestation. I measure the specific impact of the port facility opening on deforestation 
by dividing and comparing impacted (treatment) and non-impacted (control) groups of 
properties by the port facility opening using the same data. 
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Secondly, I estimate the tradeoff between the value of agricultural production and 
carbon sequestration by projecting the land use and land cover (LULC) if there had not 
been the opening of the soybean export facility in 2003 using the regression estimation 
results. The projected LULC is compared to the actual LULC to estimate the tradeoffs.  
 
Year Specific Effects on Deforestation 
The first regression estimation method is often used in event analyses to evaluate the 
impact of a certain event on a response variable. The deforestation rate regression is 
estimated as follows: 
< = = + ( ?K
	


	 + ( )KD

	



	 + L  (1) 
where < is the deforestation rate, which is the percentage of area of deforestation in 
property i relative to the remaining forest cover at time period t and = is an individual 
fixed effect to control for the farmers’ and properties’ characteristics that affect 
deforestation rates. K is a vector of time dummy variables for the years 2002 to 2010, 
year 2001 being the base year. D is a set of physical characteristics that are time invariant 
including distance to the soybean unloading facility and soil quality that may affect 
farmers’ deforestation behaviors, and L is an error term.  
The parameters ? and )M in equation (1) jointly indicate time-specific effects in 
each year. They account for the impacts of possible shocks on deforestation in each year 
such as change in the degree of governmental enforcement of environmental regulations 
or economic shock from changes in prices of agricultural products. Therefore, the 
significance of the coefficients ? and ) will reflect whether the impact of the port 
opening is significant in each year. It is expected that the coefficient ? will be positive 
and significant for the years following the opening of the port facility in 2003, showing 
the immediate effect of the port facility opening on deforestation. The standard errors for 
the total effects of single time and physical characteristic variables, which include both 
their direct effect and interaction effects, are estimated using the delta method, which 
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uses a first-order Taylor approximation to estimate the standard error of the transformed 
parameters. 
 
Constructing Control and Treatment Groups 
I construct control and treatment groups to evaluate the impact of the soybean export 
facility opening on deforestation. Setting up a control group is challenging given that this 
is not a randomized control trial and the soybean export facility opening might have 
affected all the properties in the region.  
In order to construct a control group not affected by the facility, I find a variable 
that can be used to divide the properties into two groups: relatively higher deforestation 
after 2003 (treatment group) and little change in deforestation after 2003 (control group). 
Among other variables, the distance to the soybean unloading facility is a significant 
factor that determines whether a property is affected by the new soybean export facility 
opening. The farther a property is from the port, the less likely there will be an increased 
deforestation of the property as a result of the port facility opening. The variables 
measuring the distance from the places where major economic activities occur such as 
major city and market place are one of the significant variables that are included in most 
deforestation regressions (see the Table 1A in Blackman 2013). 
I define all the properties that are farther than 80 km from the soybean unloading 
facility as the control group while the properties within 80 km from the soybean 
unloading facility are defined as the treatment group. Figure 2-3 shows scatter plots of 
each property’s percentage of deforestation by distance to the soybean unloading facility 
from 2001 to 2004. On average, the properties that are more than 80 km away from the 
soybean unloading facility have lower deforestation rates than those that are closer than 
80 km throughout all years. The pattern of deforestation in the figure shows that there had 
been an increased deforestation in the properties that are closer to the port since 2003, 
when the port facility opened in the region. Note in particular that the rate of 
deforestation did not change much after 2003 for the properties that are more than 80 km 
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away from the soybean unloading facility. To check the sensitivity of the results, I also 
did the analysis with threshold values from 60 km to 100 km.  
The statistics of each group using the 80 km threshold indicate that both groups 
have similar land quality, yet treatment group properties are located nearer from major 
roads. Table 2-1 shows the comparison of the mean of each variable used between 
control and treatment groups as defined by the distance to the soybean unloading facility. 
The properties in the treatment group are less than half distance away from the soybean 
unloading facility and have higher average deforestation rates by 2.2% compared to the 
properties in the control group. The land quality is similar for both of the groups with the 
average difference of 0.6. 
 
Impact of the Port Opening on Deforestation 
I use the difference-in-differences (DID) regression method to evaluate the impact of the 
port opening on deforestation because it can eliminate time-invariant characteristics that 
affect both control and treatment groups by double differencing. Instead of dividing the 
period to two periods of before and after the port facility opening, I estimate the DID 
estimator in each year to estimate the effect of the port facility opening on deforestation 
in each specific year. I estimate the following regression (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). 
< = = + ( ?K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where K is a vector of time dummy variable from the year 2002 to 2010, which is equal 
to one when I is the corresponding year; A is a group dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
property i is in a treatment group and 0 otherwise; D is a set of physical characteristic 
variables, including distance to federal and state roads and soil quality, which affect the 
deforestation rate; and L is an error term that is assumed to be independent of both T 
and G. 
The main parameter of interest is the set of B$C$ coefficients, which indicate the 
difference in deforestation rates between the control (Gi=0) and treatment groups (Gi=1) 
in a given year t (Tt=1); they indicate the marginal effect of the port opening on 
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deforestation in a given year t. I expect the value of B$C$ for the years in or immediately 
after 2003 (i.e., t=2003 and t=2004) to be positive and significant, indicating that the 
opening of the port facility increased deforestation. A vector of coefficients, ?, represent 
the year-specific effects on deforestation for the control group.   
 
Land Use Land Cover (LULC) Maps 
I compare the actual LULC map with the projected LULC map under the scenario that 
the new soybean export facility did not open in the S&B region. Comparing the projected 
map and the original map, I evaluate the impact of the port facility opening on tradeoffs 
between agricultural production and carbon sequestration. The projected LULC map is 
created by changing the deforestation rates of the treatment group using the estimation 
results from equation (2). The total area of deforestation that happened as a result of the 
port facility opening at time period t,  DefMQRSM, is estimated by multiplying B$C$ from 
equation (2) and the total remaining forest cover in all properties. The properties that 
have high predicted value of deforestation yUMV from equation (2) for property i within the 
treatment group are reforested until the sum of the total reforested areas reaches the 
estimated total area of additional deforestation from opening of the port in a given year t.  
 
Tradeoffs Between Agricultural Production and Carbon Sequestration 
I calculate the change in the value of agricultural production and carbon sequestration by 
using the actual and projected LULC maps. Comparing the change in the total value of 
both carbon storage and agricultural production can show whether net benefits increased 
or decreased with land-use change associated with the opening of the port facility. In 
addition to total benefits, the distribution of net benefits also matters. Some of the 
benefits of increased agricultural expansion accrue locally with increased income to 
farmers. Carbon storage, however, generates global benefits. Unless there are payments 
for carbon storage there will likely be a mismatch in who benefits from agricultural 
expansion and who benefits from carbon storage.   
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 I calculate the per hectare profit of planting soybeans in the S&B area by using 
crop price and yield data from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE 
2015), and cost data for soybean production from Huerta and Martin (2002), which 
includes both variable and fixed costs. Given data limitations, I assume that all farms are 
identical, including physical characteristics and input levels, for both yields and 
production costs. The estimated profit per hectare from soybean production in 2004 was 
$336 given a soybean price of $288.5 per ton in 2004, an average yield of soybeans of 2.7 
ton per hectare, and a cost of soybean production of $443 per hectare. I assume that 
farmers grow soybeans on land that is deforested because it is one of the four major crops 
in terms of hectares planted, and it has a higher value of crop production per hectare than 
other crops and the planted area increased dramatically in 2004 (IBGE 2015).   
I calculate the change in the amount of above-ground biomass carbon using the 
current and counterfactual LULC maps and the average storage amount of carbon per 
hectare for each LULC from Baccini et al. (2012), which is shown in Table 2-5. I 
consider changes in biomass under the assumption that the change in the soil organic 
carbon is zero between current and counterfactual LULC maps. I calculate the change of 
carbon sequestration by estimating the area change for each classification of LULC going 
from original to projected LULC to be multiplied by the amount of carbon sequestered 
per hectare for each LULC classification. 
I calculate the lost values of carbon storage and increased value of agricultural 
production as a result of the port facility opening by using the discount rate and social 
cost of carbon from the literature. The social cost of carbon is a key element in the 
benefit/cost analysis and has been a topic of discussion and debate among economists. I 
set the social cost of carbon to $40 per ton of carbon dioxide in 2014 US dollar value 
($32.9 in 2004 US dollars) and set the corresponding constant discount rate to 3% from 
the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on the Social Cost of Carbon, released in 2013 
and updated in 2015 (IWG 2015). These rates are calculated averages based on socio-
economic and emission trajectories using three models: the Dynamic Integrated model of 
Climate and the Economy (DICE) (Nordhaus 2014), the Framework for Uncertainty, 
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Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) (Anthoff and Toll 2013), and the Policy Analysis 
of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) (Hope 2013).  
 
IV. Data 
 
Land Use Land Cover 
I use maps of deforestation from the Brazilian National Institute for Space Research 
(INPE) between 2001 and 2010 (INPE 2015) to calculate the deforestation rates in each 
property in the study area. The actual and counterfactual LULC maps in 2004 are 
constructed using the LULC map in 1999 from Lu et al. (2013) and INPE’s deforested 
area map from 2001 to 2003 in the S&B area. I use the same six land use classifications 
as those in Lu et al. (2013), which are forest, savanna, other vegetation (secondary 
succession and plantation), agro-pasture, impervious surface, and water.  
 
Constructing Variables 
The deforestation rate, distance, and land quality variables are calculated using ArcMap 
software. The deforestation rate from 2001 to 2010 is calculated as the percentage of 
deforested area over the remaining forest cover in each property in a given year. The 
remaining forest cover is used to calculate the deforestation rate to give a relatively 
higher deforestation rate for the properties with less remaining forest cover. The distances 
to the soybean unloading facility and to the major road variables are calculated as the 
shortest Euclidean distance between a point or a line and an edge of a property. The 
location of the port is identified as a point using spatial coordinates and road shape files 
downloaded from Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa 2013). The land 
quality variable is calculated for each property by using area weighted average of 
agricultural aptitude in each property. The original data were downloaded from Embrapa 
(Embrapa 2013). The definition and statistics of each variable used in the model are 
given in Table 2-1. 
 
 40 
 
Control and Treatment Groups 
The property boundary data of the control and treatment groups come from two sources: 
SIMLAM system (SEMA 2012), which is the Environmental Registry System (CAR) of 
the Pará State Environmental Agency (SEMA) and the Responsible Soy Project, which is 
a joint collaboration between Cargill and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). I downloaded 
all available property boundaries from CAR. CAR was a voluntary property registration 
system of the state government before the change in the Forest Code in 2012. Currently, 
every farmer is required to be registered in the CAR. Although not all properties in the 
region of S&B have been registered in the system, it is the only publicly available data 
for most properties. I also use property boundary data from the Responsible Soy project 
that was started in 2005 by Cargill and TNC to prevent increased deforestation as a result 
of the soybean export facility opening in the region. Through the project TNC recorded 
the property boundary of all properties registered with the project to monitor 
deforestation in each property. Combining all properties in both data sets, the total 
number of properties is 529. 
The area of all properties in the data set does not represent all properties in the 
S&B region, but it is equivalent to about half of the total area of agricultural 
establishments in S&B region. The total area of all properties in the data set is 178,273 
ha, while the total area of agricultural establishments was 353,840 ha in S&B (IBGE 
2006). The properties in the data set might represent a mix of commercial farmers and 
farmers that are more environmentally conscious. The properties from TNC’s data might 
represent a group of producers that are more commercial as opposed to being subsistent 
because they are selling their products to Cargill. The properties from the CAR data set 
might represent a group of producers that are more conscious about the environment. 
Therefore, the combined data set represents both potentially high deforesting and low 
deforesting producers.   
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V. Results 
 
The main question of interest is how the opening of the new soybean export facility has 
changed deforestation in the S&B area and the resulting impact of LULC change on the 
value of agricultural production and carbon sequestration. In this section, I first present 
the results from two regressions on the impact of the opening of the port facility on 
deforestation. Then I present estimates of the monetary benefits and costs that have been 
incurred from the port facility opening. 
 
Evidence from Empirical Models 
The year specific effect and DID regressions both suggest that there was a positive and 
significant impact of the opening of the port facility on deforestation(Table 2-2 and 2-3). 
Table 2-2 from the year specific effect regression shows that there was a large increase in 
the deforestation rate in 2003 and 2004 after the port opened in 2003. The year alone 
effects excluding interaction terms’ effects in the second column suggest that the year 
alone effects on deforestation rates during 2003 (8.8%) and 2004 (15.3%) were the 
highest among all the years. In 2005 the deforestation rate was not statistically significant 
while it becomes statistically significant again in 2006 and 2007.  The calculated average 
year specific effect in the third column shows a similar trend, with high deforestation 
rates in 2003 (5%) and 2004 (12.3%) compared to other years. It is notable that the values 
of the average year specific effect for the years 2003 and 2004 are more than twice those 
of any other years. The interaction effect of the year dummies and the distance to soybean 
unloading facility variable shows that it has negative and significant effect on 
deforestation, which means that the properties closer to the soybean unloading facility 
tend to have higher deforestation rates. The land quality variables are not significant in 
most of the years. 
The positive year-specific effects in 2003 and 2004 and the absence of a 
statistically significant effect of year on deforestation in 2005 suggest a deforestation-
increasing effect of the port facility opening in 2003. It is likely that farmers increased 
deforestation in their properties to increase soybean production around the year 2003, 
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when the port facility opened. The lower effects in following years might reflect mixed 
effects of increased governmental enforcement of environmental regulations and a 
diminishing impact of the port facility opening as time progresses.  
The DID estimation results using control and treatment groups from Table 2-3 
indicate that the opening of the new soybean export facility increased deforestation in the 
treatment group by 5.5% in 2003 and 11.7% in 2004. Table 2-3 shows the average 
marginal effect of port opening on deforestation by comparing control and treatment 
groups using data between 2001 and 2010. The year specific effects for the control group 
indicate no significant effects in all years, while the treatment group had higher 
deforestation rates compared to the control group in 2002-2004, 2006, and 2009. Similar 
to the results shown in Table 2-2, the deforestation rates in the treatment group were the 
highest in 2003 (5.5%) and 2004 (11.7%) and the significant effect of the year disappears 
in 2005. The effects of physical characteristics also show that closer proximity to a major 
road and higher land quality are associated with higher deforestation rates.  
The high deforestation rates in the treatment group in 2003 and 2004 compared to 
those in the control group are distinct from any other years between 2002 and 2010. The 
rates of difference between control and treatment groups in 2003 (5.5%) and 2004 
(11.7%) are 89% and 303% higher than the third highest difference in deforestation rates 
between the control and treatment groups, that for 2006 (2.9%). These significantly high 
differences in deforestation rates between control and treatment groups, along with no 
significant difference between them in 2005 is credible evidence of the port facility 
opening’s immediate impact on deforestation.  
To check the robustness of the results, I change the threshold value that divides 
properties into control and treatment groups. The results, shown in Table 2-4, suggest that 
the change of the value of the threshold variable (distance to the soybean unloading 
facility) that defines the treatment and control groups does not affect the positive and 
significant impact of the port opening on deforestation in 2003 and 2004. The magnitude 
of the coefficient changes slightly, but there is not much variation in the coefficients of 
the impacts of the port facility both in 2003 and 2004 as the threshold value changes. The 
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change of the threshold by 5 km from between 70 km and 90 km changes the values less 
than 10% from 5.2% to 5.6% and 11.1% to 11.8% for the impacts in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. Further change in the values down to 60 km or up to 100 km changes the 
value a little more than the changes within the 70 km to 90 km range, but the values are 
still less than 20% of the values from the middle value at the 80 km threshold. This 
means that the impact of the port opening on deforestation is robust to changes in the 
threshold value.  
 
Change in LULC 
Using the regression results from the empirical models, I predict the amount of forest 
land that would exist in the counter-factual case without the port.  The total area of forest 
in the treatment group was 99,010 ha and 93,594 ha in 2003 and in 2004, respectively. 
The area that was deforested as a result of the port facility opening is 16,369 ha 
calculated as the sum of 5.5% (5,421 ha) of the total forested areas in 2003 and 11.7% 
(10,948 ha) of total forested areas in 2004. I reforest those deforested areas in each 
property until the sum of the predicted area of deforestation becomes 16,369 ha. The 
counter-factual case map in 2003 and 2004 are combined with the LULC map of 1999 
along with deforested areas in 2001 and 2002 to construct an original map with the port 
facility opening and a counter-factual map without it. Figure 2-4 shows an example from 
original and counter-factual LULC maps.  
The conversion reveals that total area of 8,359 ha, which is composed of 5,874 ha 
of primary forest and 2,486 ha of secondary forest, had been converted to Agropasture as 
a result of the port facility opening. Table 2-5 shows calculated areas of each LULC map 
between original map and projected LULC map without the port facility opening.    
 
Tradeoffs Between Agricultural Production and Carbon Sequestration 
The comparison between the total increased value of agricultural production and the 
value of released carbon differs depending on the discount rate that is used. Table 2-6 
shows how agricultural production and carbon values compare to each other using a 3% 
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discount rate. The per year profit from soybean production is $335.95/ha. Assuming an 
infinite stream of benefits using the discount rate of 3% makes the profit from soybean 
production $11,198/ha. Multiplying the total area converted to agropasture and the 
infinite stream of profit per hectare yields a total gained value of agricultural production 
of $93,606,868. The table also shows that 770,438 tons of carbon had been lost due to the 
conversion from forest and other vegetation to agropasture land after the port facility 
opening. Using 3% discount rate, a social cost of carbon in 2015 from the IWG estimate 
is $120.8 per ton of carbon in 2004 US dollars ($32.9 per ton of carbon dioxide). Using 
this value makes the total lost value of carbon $122,369,979, which makes the dollar 
value of released carbon greater than the gained value of agricultural production.  
Using a 5% discount rate makes the value of agricultural production higher than 
the value of carbon. Using a 5% discount rate changes the infinite stream of gained value 
of agricultural production to $56,164,121, while social cost of carbon changes to $36.2 
per ton of carbon in 2004 US dollars using the estimates by IWG. This makes the lost 
value of carbon $36,710,994. 
The break-even price of carbon that can compensate farmers for their loss of 
agricultural production under an infinite stream of profit would be $92.4 and $55.4 per 
ton of carbon, assuming 3% and 5% discount rates, respectively. The current social cost 
of carbon estimates from IWG is higher when using the 3% discount rate ($120.8) while 
it is lower when using the 5% discount rate ($36.2) in 2004 US dollars. The current social 
cost of carbon may not outweigh the lost value of agricultural production, depending on 
the discount rate used in the northern Brazilian Amazon. The high cost of carbon in the 
Amazon area is consistent with other recent studies, which indicate a high value of 
carbon in the Amazon (Johnston et al. 2014; O’Connell et al. 2015). 
The quantitative estimates of agricultural production and carbon values provide 
information on the increased income of farmers and on the lost value of carbon due to 
increased agricultural production within the deforested area. The results showed that the 
values are comparable to each other and that the break-even price of carbon is lower than 
the estimated social cost of carbon at a 3% discounting rate but higher than that at a 5% 
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discount rate. These results imply that the net benefit of expanding soybean production in 
the Amazon is close to the value of released carbon, and one would have to pay the 
break-even prices that are comparable to the social cost of carbon estimates from IWG to 
keep farmers from clearing land. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
Land use planning requires estimation of the impacts of alternative land uses and the 
resulting tradeoffs among different ecosystem services to be able to find the best land use 
that maximizes net benefits from conservation and development. In this paper, I 
measured the impact of the opening of a new soybean export facility on deforestation and 
resulting tradeoffs between agricultural production and carbon sequestration in the S&B 
region, located in the northern Brazilian Amazon. 
The results showed that the opening of the new soybean export facility increased 
average deforestation rates by 5.5% and 11.7% in 2003 and 2004, respectively, which 
implies a 16,369 ha conversion of forest land into agricultural land. It increased the 
income of local farmers from additional agricultural profit but released significant 
amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Overall, the increased value in agricultural 
production is approximately equal to the lost value of carbon, although the comparison 
between them varies depending on the discount rate used for the calculation. The break-
even price of carbon for farmers to forgo their agricultural profit in the study area is 
estimated to be $92.4 and $55.4 per ton of carbon, assuming 3% and 5% discount rates, 
respectively.  
These quantitative estimates of the change in deforestation rates and of the 
tradeoff values between agricultural production and carbon sequestration provide useful 
information about whether the impact of the new soybean export facility opening in the 
S&B area has increased net value. The increased in agricultural income shows that there 
is an increase in net benefits locally. This result is beneficial given high poverty rates in 
the area. The poverty rates were 43.1% and 28.4% in 2003 in the municipalities of 
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Santerém and Belterra, respectively (IBGE 2006). Even though the net benefit overall 
from the opening of the port facility is close zero when carbon losses are factored in, the 
opening of the port facility may be justified because it provided an additional income 
source for local people many of whom are poor. 
On the other hand, an argument against the opening of the port facility can be 
made because of the significant volume of lost carbon that has a value that may well 
exceed the value of increased agricultural production. Carbon sequestration is a global 
public good. In addition to carbon losses, agricultural expansion may result in declines in 
other ecosystem services, such as water quality. Considerations of other ecosystem 
services will likely increase the loss in value of ecosystem services and make it more 
likely to outweigh the increased value of agricultural production.  
If we assume that the port facility needs to be built in the area to generate 
additional income opportunities for the poor local people, society would want to 
maximize net benefits from ecosystem services including agricultural production, carbon 
sequestration, and others such as water purification. An efficient land use planning that 
maximizes the net value of ecosystem services prior to the opening of the port facility 
would require more spatially explicit information. This study was restricted to do the 
analysis at a municipality level because the information on carbon storage and 
agricultural production such as the price of crops, yields, and production costs are based 
on simple assumptions and are not spatially explicit. Further, detailed data on actual 
carbon storage per pixel by LULC in this region, variation of yields, and costs of 
producing different crops would make it possible to plan land use in a way that 
maximizes the net values of ecosystem services. It will identify areas with high values of 
ecosystem services and enable targeted development and conservation strategies for 
efficient use of land.  
With increasing concerns for degrading the environment and its impact on 
ecosystem services, it is becoming more important to quantitatively measure the impact 
of economic development on values of ecosystem services to reflect them in the future 
land-use decisions. Despite some caveats such as coarse spatial resolution of the data, this 
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study shows how one can measure the impact of new economic incentives on the 
environment and the resulting tradeoff between carbon storage and agricultural 
production. This type of impact assessment and quantification of tradeoffs would be 
helpful for similar land use planning decisions in the Amazon. It will ultimately help in 
generating higher net gains from new land use decisions by applying/modifying methods 
presented in this study and by using spatially explicit data during the planning process.     
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Table 2-1.Variable descriptions, means, and standard deviations (S.D.) 
Variable Description 
Mean  
(S.D.) 
Control Treat Total 
N=52 N=477 N=529 
Deforestation rate 
in each year 
between 2001 and 
2010 (%) 
The percentage of deforested area 
over remaining forest cover  
1.34 
(4.84) 
3.51 
(13.66) 
3.30 
(13.07) 
Distance to the 
soybean unloading 
facility (km) 
Euclidean distance from a 
property to Cargill’s soybean 
delivery facility 
92.11 
(10.86) 
41.52 
(15.80) 
46.49 
(21.52) 
Distance to a 
major road (km) 
Euclidean distance from a 
property to the nearest federal or 
state road 
7.53 
(8.47) 
4.14 
(4.98) 
4.47 
(5.50) 
Land quality Area-weighted land quality based 
on the classification of Ramalho 
and Pereira (1995). Scores range 
from 0 (no production capability) 
to 7 (most productive soil)  
5.75 
(1.58) 
5.15 
(1.91) 
5.21 
(1.89) 
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Table 2-2. Regression results for the year specific effects on deforestation 
Variables 
Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Average year specific 
effects (Standard error) 
Average individual fixed effect 0.84*** (0.27)  
Year Specific Effects   
T2002 3.61*** (1.08) 
0.86**   (0.40) T2002 × Dist. to soy unloading place  -0.04*** (0.01) 
T2002 × Land quality -0.21       (0.18) 
T2003 8.82*** (1.91) 
4.96*** (0.65) 
T2003 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.15*** (0.03) 
T2003 × Land quality 0.60       (0.31) 
T2004 15.30*** (2.74) 
12.27*** (1.10) 
T2004 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.36*** (0.04) 
T2004 × Land quality 2.65*** (0.49) 
T2005 -0.01       (0.96) 
1.03**   (0.47) 
T2005 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.02       (0.02) 
T2005 × Land quality 0.34       (0.22) 
T2006 7.49*** (1.95) 
2.28*** (0.62) 
T2006 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.09*** (0.02) 
T2006 × Land quality -0.17       (0.29) 
T2007 3.39**   (1.43) 
0.68       (0.43) 
T2007 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.02**   (0.01) 
T2007 × Land quality -0.31       (0.21) 
T2008 2.92*     (1.53) 
1.06**   (0.46) 
T2008 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.04**   (0.02) 
T2008 × Land quality 0.03       (0.26) 
T2009 2.89*** (1.07) 
1.33*** (0.51) 
T2009 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.06*** (0.02) 
T2009 × Land quality 0.27       (0.22) 
T2010 1.55*     (0.92) 
0.14      (0.36) 
T2010 × Dist. to soy unloading 
facility  
-0.03*** (0.01) 
T2010 × Land quality 0.01       (0.18) 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, using standard errors adjusted for individual 
property. Standard errors for the average year specific effects were calculated using the delta method.  
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Table 2-3. Average marginal effects of the port opening on deforestation using data from 
2001 and 2004 
Variables 
Equation (2) 
Coefficient (Standard error) 
Treat -0.06       (0.56) 
Year Specific Effects – Control group 
T2002 -0.51       (0.36) 
T2003 0.02       (0.52) 
T2004 1.72       (1.19) 
T2005 1.54       (1.38) 
T2006 -0.32       (0.47) 
T2007 0.58       (0.82) 
T2008 1.11       (0.84) 
T2009 -0.31       (0.56) 
T2010 -0.35       (0.62) 
Year Specific Effects – Treatment group 
T2002 1.52*** (0.57) 
T2003 5.48*** (0.90) 
T2004 11.70*** (1.76) 
T2005 -0.57       (1.47) 
T2006 2.90*** (0.83) 
T2007 0.12       (0.94) 
T2008 -0.06       (0.98) 
T2009 1.83**   (0.80) 
T2010 0.55       (0.73) 
Physical Characteristics ( ) 
Distance to a major road -0.07*** (0.03) 
Land quality 0.58*** (0.10) 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Standard errors are calculated 
using the delta method.  
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Table 2-4. The sensitivity of the port facility opening effect by different distance 
threshold that is used to distinguish control and treatment groups 
 
Port Facility Opening Effect – treatment 
group 
Distance to the soybean delivery facility 
(km) 
T2003 T2004 
60 6.06*** 
(1.02) 
14.13*** 
(1.79) 
65 5.07*** 
(1.01) 
12.49*** 
(1.88) 
70 5.19*** 
(1.02) 
11.80*** 
(1.97) 
75 5.55*** 
(1.06) 
11.21*** 
(2.21) 
80 5.48*** 
(0.90) 
11.70*** 
(1.76) 
85 5.16*** 
(1.07) 
11.65*** 
(2.16) 
90 5.58*** 
(1.26) 
11.11*** 
(2.74) 
95 5.08*** 
(1.49) 
12.18*** 
(2.07) 
100 4.45** 
(1.80) 
11.37*** 
(2.46) 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Standard errors are calculated 
using the delta method.  
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Table 2-5. The land use and land cover (LULC) composition in 1999 and change in 
LULC with and without port facility opening in 2004 and the amount of carbon storage in 
each land use and land cover (LULC) classification 
 LULC 1999 2004 
2004 -No port 
facility Increase 
Agropasture (ha) 82,438 110,843 102,483 -8,359 
Forest (ha) 922,569 899,140 905,014 5,874 
Impervious Surfaces (ha) 9,207 9,207 9,207 0 
Other Vegetation (ha) 167,531 162,622 165,108 2,486 
Savanna/Cerrado (ha) 5,149 5,081 5,080 0 
Water (ha) 20,870 20,870 20,870 0 
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Table 2-6. The amount of carbon sequestration in each land use and land cover (LULC) 
classification and the value of carbon and soybean production change as a result of port 
facility opening 
 LULC Area (ha) 
Carbon 
Storagea 
(ton/ha) 
Total 
Carbon 
Storage 
(ton) 
Total Carbon 
Storage 
Valueb 
($)  
Agricultural 
Valuec ($) 
Agropasture 8,359 29 242,425  93,606,868 
Forest -5,874 139 -816,478 
-122,369,979 
 
Other Vegetation  -2,486 79 -196,385  
a Baccini et al. 2012 
b Assuming $120.8 per ton of carbon value in 2004 US dollars (IWG 2015) 
c Assuming $335.95 per hectare of profit from soybean production (Huerta and Martin 
2002; IBGE 2015) 
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Figure 2-1. The location of Cargill soybean export facility in Santarém near the 
confluence of the Amazon and Tapajos Rivers in northern Brazil 
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Figure 2-2. Comparison of the annual percentage of deforested land over the remaining 
forest area in Amazon, Pará, Santarém and Belterra (S&B) and surrounding 10 
municipalities 
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Figure 2-3. Scatter plots of each property’s percentage of deforestation by distance to the 
soybean unloading facility place from 2001 to 2004 
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Figure 2-4. Original LULC (left) and projected LULC without opening of a new soybean 
export facility in 2004 
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Chapter 3. Global Agricultural Production Cost: A Missing 
Component in Calculating Economic Rent for Land-Use Decisions 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Land use affects the provision of many goods and services including the production of 
marketed commodities and non-marketed ecosystem services. Conversion of forest into 
agricultural land increases agricultural production that can help feed increasing 
populations but also releases carbon into the atmosphere that contributes to climate 
change. In order to efficiently manage land and to increase the net value of the provision 
of food and other ecosystem services, information is needed on all benefits and costs of 
alternative land uses. Failure to obtain such information will lead to land-use decisions 
that will generate inefficient results. 
Economic rent (profit) from crop production is an important determinant of land 
use. In addition, estimates of economic rent from crop production are necessary for 
calculating the opportunity cost of taking land out of crop production and putting it to 
other land uses such as protected areas or urban development. Economic rent per unit 
area of crop production is equal to revenue from crop production (price x yield per unit 
area) minus production cost (per unit area). Despite the fact that 38% of total land area in 
the world is used for agricultural production (FAOSTAT 2015), no globally consistent 
data set exists for production cost. Globally consistent data do exist for prices and yields. 
Providing data on agricultural production costs, therefore, fills an important gap and 
allows for the generation of a globally consistent data set on economic rent from 
agricultural production. Consideration of such economic rents is a necessary component 
for analyzing the full costs and benefits of various land-use scenarios and, ideally, will 
lead to more efficient land-use decisions. 
In this study, I construct a globally consistent production cost data set for ten 
major crops. I construct the data set in each country by piecing together data on particular 
components of costs from a number of existing global data sets such as FAOSTAT, 
which is compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). When there are no 
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existing global data sets available for a particular cost item, I use data sets from 
individual countries (e.g., production cost data in the US published by the US Department 
of Agriculture) and adjust for differences in various factors such as labor productivity, 
unit prices of inputs, and yields. After constructing the data set, I validate the constructed 
production cost data set by comparing constructed wheat production cost data and wheat 
production cost data from the International Wheat and Maize Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT) and the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) of the European 
Commission. Then, I show how much difference it makes to include production costs 
when calculating economic rent compared to using only revenue, which has been used as 
an alternative to profit.    
In the production economics literature, there are many global-scale agricultural 
productivity comparison studies that utilize some agricultural input price and quantity 
information (e.g., Alston et al. 2009; Avila and Evenson 2010; Coelli and Rao 2005; 
Hayami and Ruttan 1985; O’Gorman and Pardey 2010). However, none of these studies 
provide crop-specific globally consistent production cost estimates. For example, Avila 
and Evenson (2010) compute total factor productivity growth in developing countries by 
calculating input and output growth rates and input cost shares to investigate the factors 
that cause productivity growth. They calculate input cost shares for the whole agricultural 
sector (i.e. not crop specific) in developing countries. They use national data on input 
cost shares from Brazil and India and adjust this for other countries by using input 
quantity to crop land ratios in each country relative to those in Brazil and India. There are 
many local level productivity or profitability analyses providing production cost data for 
some crops (e.g., Ajayi et al. 2009 in Zambia; Jin et al. 2010 in China; Singh et al. 2013 
in India). However, the definitions of the costs differ across studies and the geographic 
coverage of each study is limited, so these studies are of limited use in a assembling a 
consistent profit comparison at a global scale.  
As a result of the lack of a globally consistent agricultural production cost data, 
many local and global land-use studies have used revenue as a measure of economic rent. 
Naidoo and Iwamura (2007) constructed a global map of economic rent using revenue 
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while ignoring production cost. Many subsequent studies (e.g., Busch et al. 2012; 
McCarthy et al. 2012; Wedland et al. 2010; Wünscher et al. 2008) have used their data 
set as an approximation of the opportunity cost of land. For example, McCarthy et al. 
(2012) used the data set as a proxy for the cost of compensation for land preservation to 
reduce extinction risk of certain bird species on a global scale. Wedland et al. (2010) 
extracted the Madagascar data from Naidoo and Iwamura (2007) and used it to identify 
areas where a payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme would increase net benefits 
taking into consideration biodiversity, carbon, and water services in Madagascar. Using 
revenue as an estimate of the opportunity cost of land assumes that there is no cost of 
production and ignores spatial variation in socioeconomic factors. 
There have been other efforts to provide guidelines for constructing standardized 
global agricultural production costs, but none provides actual cost data on a global scale. 
The Handbook on Agricultural Cost of Production Statistics by the FAO (2014) is the 
most recent initiative to provide guidelines for designing and implementing standardized 
cost of production data. The handbook provides recommendations for methods to collect 
production cost data using experiences from countries that already have national systems 
to collect them. There are other similar guidelines such as Commodity Costs and Returns 
Estimation Handbook by AAEA (2000) and the Sustainability and Production Costs in 
the Global Farming Sector by the European Commission (2012). They provide 
methodologies and possible data sources for production costs but do not provide actual 
crop production cost data that are globally consistent.  
 Another group that focuses on collecting standardized cost of agricultural 
production is Agri Benchmark. It is an organization of various institutions and 
individuals that has a network of agricultural economists and producer groups around the 
world that aims to construct an internationally standardized agricultural production data 
set. As of June 2014, they have ongoing research to cover multiple cash crops in two 
countries in Africa, six countries in Asia, eight countries in Europe, two countries in 
North America, and three countries in Latin America. Much of their data are not publicly 
available and they do not cover all regions of the world. 
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In what follows, I describe the data sources, assumptions, and methods I used to 
develop a globally consistent data set of agricultural production costs. I then summarize 
the results by showing regional weighted averages of production costs for each crop, 
provided in the Appendix.  
I compare wheat production cost from the constructed data set to data from the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) to check on the validity 
of the constructed data. I find some significant differences (greater or less than 50% of 
the constructed values) in the comparison of the regional average wheat production cost 
with the CIMMYT data. The significant differences in regional average wheat production 
cost between the constructed data set and CIMMYT data set exist in 4 out of 11 regions 
for fertilizer costs, 4 out of 10 regions for labor costs, 1 out of 7 regions machinery costs, 
and 7 out of 13 regions for seed costs. The results from validation of the constructed cost 
data set using methods in this paper indicate that the regional weighted average values of 
wheat production cost match with those of other data sets relatively better than the 
individual country values. At a country level, significant differences exist in 8 out of 21 
for fertilizer costs, 8 out of 14 for labor costs, 4 out of 14 for machinery costs, and 18 out 
of 31 countries for seed costs.  
Lastly, using the wheat production cost data, I show how much difference it 
makes to use profit instead of revenue to estimate economic rent. The comparison of 
revenue and profit maps from wheat production suggests not only that some areas with 
high revenue appear to have negative profit values but also that the regions with high 
economic rent per hectare change significantly when using profit instead of revenue as a 
measurement of economic rent. For example, the central U.S., many European countries, 
and most of western China have high revenues from wheat production but profit is 
negative in these regions because of high production costs4. The results also show that 
regions with high profits from wheat production match areas with a high fraction of 
wheat harvested area over total area better than the areas with high revenue. The major 
                                                 
4 Central US’ profit is negative without consideration of distortion factors such as 
subsidies from the government, which are covered in the “Discussion” section. 
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countries that produce wheat include India, eastern China, and the western U.S. These 
regions show higher profits from wheat production compared to other regions, while the 
revenue map does not differentiate these regions as having higher revenue compared to 
other regions. These results further validate the constructed cost data. 
These results suggest potential problems in using revenue as a proxy for economic 
rent. Using revenue as a proxy for economic rent overestimates the value of agricultural 
returns, which effectively underweights the value of other ecosystem services such as 
carbon sequestration. Using revenue as a proxy for economic rent may also result in a 
distorted picture of where agriculture should be a priority and where conservation should 
be a priority.   
 
II. Construction of the Global Production Cost Data 
 
The constructed data set on production costs includes the costs for fertilizer, labor, 
machinery, and seed. I define production costs per hectare as the amount of the input 
required per hectare times the unit cost of the input. For example, fertilizer cost is the 
sum over all types of fertilizer of the amount of a specific type of fertilizer applied per 
hectare times the cost per unit of that specific fertilizer. I calculate crop-specific per 
hectare production cost for 10 major crops: barley, maize, potato, rapeseed, rice, rye, 
soybean, sugar beet, sunflower, and wheat. Further, I define cost for three different 
production intensity levels: actual, low intensity, and high intensity production.  
It should be noted at the outset that this is a first attempt to provide a uniform 
global data set for agricultural production cost. The numbers reported here should be 
viewed as providing a rough approximation of production costs rather than precise 
estimates. I have been forced to make a number of assumptions because of the limited 
data that are globally available. Better estimates of production cost can be done in 
particular countries (e.g., the U.S.) where more data are readily available. I have ignored 
a number of details that may be quite important in determining production costs for 
particular crops in particular regions. It is my hope that by putting together these numbers 
 63 
 
in a clear and transparent fashion I will make it easier for others to improve upon my 
efforts. 
 
Data Sources  
While good production cost data exist for some individual countries (e.g., production cost 
data in the US published by the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA)), uniform cost data across all countries do not exist. Here I 
calculate production costs for all countries constructed by piecing together data on 
particular components of cost from a number of existing global data sets. To build a 
uniform global data set on agricultural production cost I use data in FAOSTAT compiled 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the U.S. National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), ERS of the USDA, the International Seed Federation (ISF), 
and several other country and sub-national statistics. In Table 3-1 I provide a brief 
description of the data available on input unit costs and input amounts used per hectare 
for each major component of cost: fertilizer, labor, machinery, and seed. For some inputs, 
namely machinery and seed, I have cost data that combine unit cost and quantity rather 
than data on unit cost and quantity separately.   
 
General Methods 
Unit cost conversion method 
I adjust all unit costs both temporally and spatially to convert nominal unit costs in a 
given year measured in local currency to 2010 US dollars. To convert unit costs in a 
given year to 2010 unit costs in local currency I use the GDP deflator for each country 
from the World Bank (World Bank 2012a). I then convert 2010 local currency to 2010 
US dollars using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) from the World Bank (2012b). PPP 
conversion has advantages relative to actual exchange rates because it increases the 
comparability among unit costs in different countries (Alston et al. 2009; Pardey et al. 
1992). The unit cost is calculated as follows: 
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 W = XW Y 1Z[ 1  (1) 
where W  is the unit cost of item k in country i in 2010 US dollars; XW  denotes unit cost 
of item k in country i in year t in local currency unit (LC); Z is the GDP deflator of 
country i with the base year of GDP deflator in 2010 being normalized to 1;   is the 
PPP conversion factor (LCU per US dollar) of country i in 2010. I adjusted deflation 
factors for individual countries that underwent currency reform using the notes from FAO 
(FAO 2013). 
If unit costs are not available in local currency units but are available in US 
dollars, I convert US dollar units back to the local currency units, use the GDP deflator 
for the local currency to convert to 2010 values in the local currency, and then convert 
this back to US dollars. Import prices of machines in my data set are available only in US 
dollar units. This exercise has been done in order to consistently apply equation (1) for all 
cost items.  
 
Exclusion of outliers 
After conversion of all unit costs into 2010 US dollars I exclude outlier observations. It is 
important to exclude outliers for two reasons. First, there are some values that differ by 
two orders of magnitude or more compared to values in other years. These values are 
likely to reflect errors in recording the data rather than actual cost differences. For 
example, the per unit import price of a combine harvester in Denmark in 2009 is $8 while 
other years’ values range from $80,000 to $150,000 from 2002 to 2008. Second, some 
countries experienced rapid changes in the value of their currency during this time period. 
In some cases, the timing of currency changes within a country reflected in the GDP 
deflator from the World Bank, or in the exchange rate from IMF, does not match 
precisely with that reflected in the FAOSTAT data set.  
I use median absolute deviation (MAD) to set a threshold to detect outliers. MAD 
measures how far a value is from the median of a series of values. It is used widely for 
the detection of outliers because of its simplicity and robustness (Rousseeuw and Croux 
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1993). It is easy to calculate and more robust to outliers than using standard deviations 
from the mean because the presence of outliers significantly affects the value of standard 
deviations from the mean. An observation (\) is removed if the following condition 
holds: 
 ]\W − ^Z_`a0b 1]c > 2, c = 1.4826 × g = 1.4826 × ^Z_`a(]\W − ^Z_`a0b 1]) (2) 
where \W  is the unit cost of fertilizer, labor, machine, or seed in country i in 2010 US 
dollars and b  is a set of all available unit costs in country i. The value 1.4826 is the 
constant scale factor for the MAD to be a consistent estimator of the standard deviation 
under the assumption of a normal distribution. It is standard practice to use values of 2 or 
3 for determining the threshold for outliers. I chose to use 2 as the cutoff value. I report in 
each cost section how many observations have been excluded. I also report how many 
observations would have been excluded if I had used 3 as a cutoff value. Additional 
exclusion of observations of extreme values is done as explained in each cost item 
section. 
 
Averaging time series data for a country 
I provide one average per unit cost for each country for each input instead of providing 
year specific numbers for each year in the data set. I also do not predict the values using 
either interpolation or forecast methods. This is because I want to use the same method 
for all cost items, and some data, such as fertilizer unit costs, are too sparse to interpolate 
or to predict for the purpose of providing consistent estimates for each year. 
After conversion to 2010 US dollars and excluding inconsistent unit costs for each 
country, I use the average of the most recently available five years’ data for a given 
country, where the number of observations in each country should be greater than or 
equal to two. Averaging across multiple years makes the reported data less susceptible to 
errors introduced in any given year.  Averaging the most recent data makes the data more 
current and more reliable because there is less chance of currency devaluations in recent 
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years than there was in the early 1990s. 
 
Detailed country specific data  
I collect and use detailed country specific data if such globally consistent data are 
available. However, some data are not available for some countries in all years. For 
example, crop specific labor use hours, machinery, or seed costs are available in the US 
but not in most other countries.  When this is the case, I use detailed information from the 
US but adjust it for differences in various factors such as unit costs, applications 
differences in yields, number of growing days, and agricultural productivity.  
The countries or regions with zero observation even after adjustment using US 
data because of missing adjustment factors are filled using a weighted regional average 
value described in the following section.  
 
Weighted average by geographic region 
Data for individual countries often have significant variability and may be subject to a 
high degree of error. Therefore, I grouped countries into regions to increase the reliability 
of the calculated cost numbers. Regional averages are calculated as a weighted average of 
cost using total agricultural production value in each country as the weight. I used 19 
geographic regions defined by FAO (FAOSTAT 2011a).  
 
Production intensity 
I define three production intensity levels: actual, low intensity, and high intensity. I use 
different fertilizer input, machinery cost, and seed cost for each intensity level.  In future 
research I hope to consider different input levels for labor as well.  
Fertilizer input and corresponding yield data are from Mueller et al. (2012). 
Actual fertilizer input is defined as fertilizer quantity that is currently in use in each 
country. Mueller et al. (2012) divided the world into 100 climate bins using precipitation 
and growing degree-day characteristics. Low intensity production and high intensity 
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production fertilizer input are defined as fertilizer quantities that are required to produce 
25% and 75% of maximum yield in the climate bin, respectively.  
I assume that low intensity agriculture does not use machinery, so that machinery 
cost for low intensity production is zero. Machinery cost for high and actual intensity 
agriculture is calculated by adjusting per hectare US machinery cost data. A similar 
procedure is applied to the calculation of seed cost for each intensity level. The details on 
how high, actual, and low intensity machinery and seed costs are calculated are explained 
in detail in the following section “Cost Calculation Methods.”  
 
Cost Calculation Methods 
Fertilizer Cost 
Fertilizer unit cost ($/ton)  
I use the most recently available years of data between 1991 and 2002, to construct the 
fertilizer unit cost data (FAOSTAT 2011b). There are no updates of the data after 2002. 
Fertilizer unit cost is measured as the average price per metric ton of nutrients, nitrogen 
(N), phosphate (P), and potassium (K), in each region. I chose the top two most 
frequently available fertilizer items from the FAO fertilizer price archive data set: 
ammonium sulfate and urea for nitrogenous fertilizer; concentrated superphosphate and 
single superphosphate for phosphate fertilizer; and muriate over 45% K2O and potassium 
sulfate for potassium fertilizer. I used unit costs of urea and superphosphate for the 
nutrients N and P, respectively, because they are used more frequently and they contain 
higher percentage of nutrients than the other commodity. If these are not available, I then 
use ammonium sulfate and single superphosphate unit costs if these are available. The 
average unit cost of potassium sulfate and muriate over 45% is used for the nutrient K. 
The average per metric ton unit cost of fertilizer n in country i in 2010 US dollar, hi9 , is 
 hi = `jikl × 1m ( hi

W  nℎZpZ 1998 ≥ r ≥ 1993 tLuℎ Iℎ`I m ≥ 2 (3) 
where m is the number of positive observations in country i between k and 2002; hi  is 
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the price of per metric ton of fertilizer nutrient n of country i in year t expressed in 2010 
US dollars by the equation (1); `jikl is an adjustment factor for fertilizer nutrient of n in 
the US, which is the average inflation-adjusted fertilizer price increase in the US from 
USDA ERS data set.   
The unit costs are “per metric ton of plant nutrients for straight fertilizers” 
(FAOSTAT 2011b). After conversion of the unit costs to 2010 US dollars, the MAD 
method using 2 as a cut-off value excluded 203 observations out of 2,368 observations 
(using 3 as a cut-off value excludes 91 observations). Additionally, I excluded 15 outliers 
with extreme unit costs that are below $10 or more than $10,000 per metric ton of N, P, 
or K fertilizers. The countries with excluded outliers include Botswana, Bulgaria, 
Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Romania, Swaziland, and Ukraine. These extreme values 
result from either measurement error or mismatch of currency reform period between 
FAO and World Bank data.  
 I average the most recent five years of available data between 1993 and 2002 and 
adjust for the unit cost increase for each fertilizer type using the average inflation-
adjusted fertilizer unit cost increase in the US (`jikl) from the USDA ERS data set. I 
use increase in the unit cost of fertilizer in the US data because the US is one of major 
producers of most fertilizer types and have data readily available. This adjustment is 
necessary because fertilizer unit costs increased significantly in the 2000s due to changes 
in other factors such as oil price. Therefore, just using the average of available data 
between 1993 and 2002 will underestimate the unit cost of fertilizer. I adjust each 
fertilizer price to an average price between 2008 and 2012.  
Fertilizers may provide other benefits other than just providing nutrients. For 
example, ammonium in ammonium sulfate fertilizer lowers the pH balance of the soil. I 
do not account for other benefits or change application rates to account for these other 
benefits.  I measure application in terms of the amount of N, P, or K delivered by the 
fertilizer. For example, farmers need to apply 2 tons of potassium sulfate in order to 
apply 1 ton of K2O. Table 3-3 represents conversion rates that FAO used to calculate 
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fertilizer unit costs per metric ton of plant nutrients from unit costs for 6 fertilizer 
commodities chosen for the data set.  
 
Fertilizer quantity  
Crop-specific application rates of N, P, and K fertilizers for each country are taken from 
the Mueller et al. (2012) fertilizer data set.  This data set harmonized estimates of crop-
specific application rates with country and subnational fertilizer consumption statistics 
between 1997 and 2003 centered on year 2000. The major data set that it uses is the 5th 
edition of the FAO publication “Fertilizer use by crop” (FAO 2002). It is a joint 
publication from the International Fertilizer Industry Association (IFA), the International 
Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC), the International Potash Institute (IPI), the 
Phosphate and Potash Institute (PPI), and FAO. It covers Latin America, Africa, West 
Asia, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Mueller et al. (2012) combined this 
data set and national agricultural census reports to make a globally consistent fertilizer 
use data set by crop.  
I define actual fertilizer input as fertilizer quantity that is currently in use in each 
country. Low intensity production and high intensity production fertilizer input are 
defined as fertilizer quantity that is required to produce 25% and 75% of attainable yield 
in the climate bin, respectively. Mueller et al. (2012) divided the world into 100 climate 
bins using precipitation and growing degree-day characteristics to define attainable yields 
by identifying areas with high yields within a similar climate zone.  
 
Fertilizer cost per ha 
The weighted average per ha fertilizer cost of crop k in region j (hW9) is calculated using 
each country’s calculated fertilizer cost values. Per ha fertilizer cost of crop k of country i 
in 2010 US dollar, hW , is calculated using average fertilizer price of nutrient n in country 
i, hi, from equation (3) and fertilizer quantity of nutrient n for crop k in country i, hviW  
from Mueller et al. (2012) data set: 
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 hW9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 hW = (
∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 ( hi  hviWi  (4) 
where I is the number of countries that have both unit cost and quantity data in region 
j; ∑ xyz{y|}y~&∑ ∑ xyz{y|}y~&|~|  is the proportion of total value of agricultural production of country i in 
region j, which is used as a weight to get the weighted average of fertilizer cost in region 
j, where Ww is the world price of agricultural commodity k in constant 2004-2006 
international dollars from FAOSTAT (FAOSTAT 2012); vW  is average quantity 
produced of crop k in country i between 2006 and 2010; K is the number of all 
agricultural products produced in country i.  
 
Agricultural Labor Cost 
Agricultural labor unit cost - wage rate ($/hour) 
Agricultural labor unit cost is defined as the average hourly wage rate for male 
agricultural workers. Agricultural hourly wage can be divided into two categories: hourly 
wage rate for hired labor and hourly wage rate for unpaid labor, e.g., family labor. The 
wage rate for unpaid labor is defined as the wage rate of non-farm workers paid to farm 
operators working off farm (AAEA 2000). I use both unpaid labor and hired labor wage 
rates for all countries. I assume that unpaid labor workers can work as laborers in other 
industries or work as a supervisor in other farms, and use the higher value as an 
opportunity cost of unpaid labor. Therefore, I define unpaid labor wage rate as either the 
average of a laborer’s wage rate in other industries including textile, printing, 
manufacturing of chemical and industrial products, machinery, and construction, or the 
supervisor’s wage rate, whichever is greater. The data on wage rates comes from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO)’s “October Inquiry”. ILO sends out a 
questionnaire to ask for wages for different occupations within particular industries. I 
used wage rates for field crop and plantations workers for hired labor wage rates and 
wage rates for field crop and plantations supervisors and laborers for other industries 
including textile, printing, manufacturing of chemical and industrial products, machinery, 
 71 
 
and construction for unpaid labor wage rates. Definitions from ILO for each type are as 
follows (ILO 2010): 
Agricultural Worker: performs a variety of tasks relating to propagation, 
cultivation and harvesting of plantation products  
Agricultural Supervisor: supervises operations in connection with growing, 
harvesting and marketing of agricultural produce, and maintenance of 
machinery, implements and equipment, under the direction of the farm manager 
Industry Laborer: performs one or more manual tasks requiring a minimum of 
training, little or no previous experience and mainly physical effort.  
Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) and Oostendorp (2005) refined the ILO data and these 
data were updated by Oostendorp (2012). Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) and 
Oostendorp (2005, 2012) removed outliers and standardized the data using country-
specific data correction factors. The method used for the data set is explained in detail in 
Oostendorp (2005). ILO does not report wage rate data in a consistent format. For 
example, ILO reports male monthly wage rate for some countries and female weekly 
wage rate for others. Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) normalized the ILO data by 
changing the unit of available wage rate data to hourly wage rate for male workers. The 
data are downloadable at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) website.   
The available hourly wage rate data for each country between 1990 and 2008 are 
expressed in 2010 US dollars using the equation (1) and inconsistent observations have 
been excluded as is explained in the general method section. The MAD method using 2 
as a cut-off value excluded 471 observations out of 4,700 observations (using 3 as a cut-
off value excludes 274 observations). Additionally, I excluded 54 outliers with unit costs 
of labor higher than $25/hour, which is higher than the wage rate in the US. The average 
hourly wage rate of agricultural workers and supervisors and laborers in other industries 
in country i,  , is  
  = 1m ( ,

W  , I\Z ∈ \`_, La\`_ (5) 
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nℎZpZ 2004 ≥ r ≥ 1990 tLuℎ Iℎ`I m ≥ 2 
where m is the number of positive observations in country i between year k and 2008; ,  is the wage rate of a country i between year k and 2008 for paid or unpaid 
workers, expressed in 2010 US dollars calculated using the equation (1).  
 
Agricultural labor quantity 
Agricultural labor quantity is measured as the average number of hours required per 
hectare to grow crop k in country i, XW /ℎ`. Data on average number of hours required 
per hectare for crop k is not available for most countries. I use the following methods to 
estimate labor quantity per hectare by country by crop. 
Data on the average number of hours required per hectare for crop k in the US, XWkl/ℎ`, can be calculated using data from USDA ERS.  I also have labor productivity 
numbers for the whole agricultural sector (but not for specific crops) for most countries 
and I have yield by crop for most countries. To estimate XW /ℎ` I use the following 
identity:  
 XWℎ` × vW /XWvW /ℎ` = XW
klℎ` × vWkl/XWklvWkl/ℎ` = 1 (6) 
where vW /XW  is labor productivity for crop k in country i, and vW /ℎ` is per hectare 
yield for crop k in country i; vWkl/XWkl is labor productivity for crop k in the US; vWkl/ℎ` is per hectare yield for crop k in the US. I rearrange equation (6) to solve for XW /ℎ`:  
 XWℎ` = XWklℎ` × vWkl/XWklvW /XW × vW
 /ℎ`vWkl/ℎ` (7) 
The first term on the right hand side, 
 , is calculated by dividing per hectare 
labor cost for production of crop k by agricultural wage rate in the US. USDA ERS 
estimates per hectare labor cost by summing up paid and unpaid labor costs. Paid labor 
cost is calculated by using direct cost for paid and contract workers including benefits. 
Unpaid labor cost is calculated by multiplying unpaid labor hours and “estimated 
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opportunity wage rate of farm operators working off-farm” (ERS 2014).  Since I have 
two different wage rates and labor costs for paid and unpaid workers, I divide labor cost 
by wage rate for each type: 
 XWklℎ` = ( X,W
kl
ℎ` = (
u,Wklkl  I\Z ∈ \`_, La\`_ 
(8) 
where u,Wkl  is national average per hectare paid and unpaid labor cost for production of 
crop k in the US calculated from USDA ERS and university extension data as described 
in the USDA ERS data documentation (ERS 2014); kl is hourly wage rate of paid and 
unpaid workers in the US from equation (5).  
To estimate the second term on the right hand side of the equation (7) I make two 
additional assumptions. First, total output quantity in country i, v, can be measured 
using the world price of each agricultural commodity as a weight. Alston et al. (2009) 
used the world price of agricultural commodities as the weight to measure total 
agricultural quantity in order to calculate labor productivity. Using the price as a weight 
is necessary because agricultural commodities have different size and volume. For 
example, a ton of potatoes and a ton of blueberries cannot sensibly be aggregated using 
weight or volume measures. A similar kind of weight adjustment using prices can be 
found in Hayami and Ruttan (1970) and their following papers (Hayami and Ruttan 1971; 
Kawagoe et al. 1985; Kawagoe and Hayami 1985). Second, I assume that labor 
productivity of crop k relative to overall agricultural labor productivity is the same in the 
US and in country i, i.e., 
{y/y{/ ≈ {y| /y|{|/| .  
Using these two assumptions I calculate 
/% /%  by  
vWkl/XWklvW /XW ≈ v
kl/Xklv/X =
1m ∑ ∑ WwvWklbW	XklKXkl
	


1m ∑ ∑ WwvWbW	X KX
	



, 
Xkl = X kl + @klX kl  `a X = X  + @X     
(9) 
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KXkl = Xkl × pn_a`tkl `a KX = X × pn_a`t 
where m is the number of positive observations in country i between 2006 and 2010; Ww 
is the world price of agricultural commodity k in constant 2004-2006 international dollars 
from FAOSTAT (FAOSTAT 2012); vWkl and vW  are quantity produced of crop k in the 
US and in country i in year t, respectively; Xkland X  are the number of total effective 
number of agricultural production workers in the US and in country i in year t; KXkl 
and KX are yearly total number of hours actually worked by an agricultural employee 
in the US and in country i between 2006 and 2010;  X kl  and X   is male 
agricultural production workers in the US and in country i in year t, respectively; X kl  and X   are female agricultural production workers in the US and in 
country i in year t, respectively; @kl and @are multipliers to convert the number of 
female workers to comparable number of male workers for the US and for country i 
calculated in Oostendorp (2012). The average value of γ in each region is used for 
countries with no γ. Xkl and X are average weekly number of hours worked by 
agricultural, forestry, and fishery laborers in the US and in country i between 2001 and 
2013 (ILO 2014;NASS 2014). pn_a`tkl and pn_a`t are the number of 
growing days in the US and in country i. The number of growing days is the area 
weighted average length of growing period in each country using length of growing 
season data from FAO (FAO 2015) and total agricultural area data from FAOSTAT. 
There are a number of assumptions that I make for the calculation of labor 
quantity per hectare. The number of male and female economically active population in 
agriculture does not exclude population in fishery and forestry in the FAOSTAT (2011d). 
I assume that the effect of those populations on relative labor productivity between US 
and each region is not significant. I also assume that the number of growing days is 
approximately same as the number of working days in each country. For example, mean 
actual farm work days for male field crop farm workers between 2006 and 2010 were 
calculated as 210.2 days or 36.1 weeks from the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NAWS) data, which is not too much different from the area-weighted length of growing 
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days of 225 days (NASS 2014). Using the average weekly number of hours worked by 
ILO I excluded observations that are not represented as annual average due to 
seasonality. For example, I used Mexico’s annual average hours actually worked within a 
week for agricultural workers, which are 45 between 2009 and 2010 instead of using the 
average hours actually worked during the second quarter of the year, which are 35.2 
between 2011 and 2013. Xkl was calculated using the data from NAWS data by 
USDA (NASS 2014) because the data were not available in the ILO data set. Mean 
number of hours worked by hired labor workers was 49.07 hours between 2006 and 2010. 
The per hectare yield of crop k in country i to that in the US in the third term in 
equation (7) is calculated by 
 vW /ℎ`vWkl/ℎ` =
1m ∑ vW`pZ`W
	


1m ∑ vWkl`pZ`Wkl
	



 (10) 
where `pZ`W  is total production area of crop k in country i in year t. 
 
 Labor cost per ha 
Per hectare weighted average of labor cost for production of crop k for region j, XW9  is 
calculated by using the proportion of the value of total agricultural products of country i 
in region j as in equation (4) as follows:  
XW9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 XW = (
∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 (  ×
X,Wℎ`  I\Z ∈ \`_, La\`_ 
(11) 
where X,W  is the average number of hours required per hectare for crop k in country 
i. 
 
Machinery Cost 
I calculate per hectare machinery cost in each region and provide estimates of machinery 
cost for three different intensity levels: low, high, and actual intensity. I adjust per hectare 
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machinery cost in the US by using the relative list price of machines because the price of 
machines are used to calculate depreciation, maintenance, and operating costs of 
agricultural machines in the literature (AAEA 2000). I adjust the calculated high intensity 
production cost in each country by the ratio of average per hectare number of machines in 
use in the country compared to those in the US.  
I use per unit import price for three types of machinery in each country as the list 
price of new machinery. FAOSTAT (2011c) has data on total import value and quantity 
of agricultural machinery since 1961. I use the most recent 5-year data of import price per 
machine. Machinery import value and quantity in use data are available in 198 countries 
between 2000 and 2009. I use import price data on agricultural tractors, plows, and 
combine harvesters-threshers because of their high use and the availability of data around 
the world: 198 countries have tractor prices; 136 have prices combine harvester prices; 
and 158 have plows prices. The available import price of machinery data for each country 
between 2000 and 2009 are expressed in 2010 US dollars using the equation (1) and 
inconsistent observations have been excluded as is explained in the general method 
section. The MAD method using 2 as a cut-off value excluded 313 observations out of 
2,334 observations (using 3 as a cut-off value excludes 188 observations). Additionally, I 
excluded 12 outliers with unit costs of machinery lower than $100. 
There are a number of additional factors that affect machinery cost that I did not 
include because of lack of data.  For example, I did not consider the freight cost of 
moving machinery from port to field. I assumed that the estimated life and cumulative 
maintenance and other operating costs are a constant proportion of list price of machines 
and this does not vary across countries for the same machine.  
 
High intensity cost per ha 
High intensity per hectare machinery cost in region j, _ℎ_gW9 , is measured as the 
weighted average of per hectare machinery cost for the production of crop k in all 
countries in the region in 2010 US dollars. Individual country i’s high intensity 
machinery cost, _ℎ_gW , is calculated by adjusting per hectare machinery cost in the 
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US using average initial list price of machines as a weight. The following formula is used 
to estimate _ℎ_gW9:  
_ℎ_gW9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 _ℎ_gW
= ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 gWkl
XXkl 
nℎZpZ  X = ( 1m ( X

 W  
Xkl = ( 1m ( Xkl

 W  nℎZpZ g ∈ Ip`uIp, \¡n, u^¢_aZ `a 2005 ≥ r ≥ 2000 tLuℎ Iℎ`I m ≥ 2 
(12) 
where gWkl is the per hectare average cost of machinery for the production of crop k in 
the US collected from USDA ERS and other university extension data; X is the sum of 
average list price of machinery, M, tractor, plow, and combine in country i between k and 
2009 in 2010 US dollars; Xkl is the sum of average list price of tractor, plow, and 
combine in the US between k and 2009 in 2010 US dollars; X  is the list price of 
machinery M in year t for country i in 2010 US dollar calculated using the equation (1); Xkl is the list price of machinery M in year t in the US; m is the number of positive 
observations in country i between k and 2009 in 2010 US dollars. 
 
Actual cost per ha  
Actual intensity per hectare machinery cost in region j, uIL`¡_gW9, is measured as the 
weighted average of per hectare machinery cost in all countries in the region for the 
production of crop k in 2010 US dollars. Actual per hectare machinery cost in country i, 
Actual_gW , is measured as the average per hectare machinery cost for the production of 
crop k in 2010 US dollars. I divide countries into two groups, “high use” and “low use” 
countries, using per hectare number of machines in use. All countries are defined as “high 
use” if the number of per hectare machinery use is higher than that in the US, and as “low 
use” otherwise. The actual production machinery cost for “high use” countries in 
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production of crop k in country i is assume to be the same as _ℎ_gW . The actual 
production machinery cost for the “low use” countries in production of crop k in country 
i, uIL`¡_gW , is calculated by adjusting high intensity cost by the ratio of per hectare 
number of machines in use in a country compared to that of the crop in the US. 
 uIL`¡_gW9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 uIL`¡_gW , nℎZpZ  
 uIL`¡_gW = £_ℎ_gW , _ LtZ/ℎ` ≥ LtZkl/ℎ` _ℎ_gW ¤¥%/¤¥/ , IℎZpn_tZ  
(13) 
where _ℎ_gW  is per hectare machinery cost for the production of crop k in country i 
from equation (12); LtZ/ℎ`  is per hectare number of combine or tractor in use in 
country i; LtZkl/ℎ` is per hectare number of combine or tractor in use in the US; 
¤¥%/¤¥/ is relative average per hectare number of machines in use in country i to that in 
the US. 
  
Seed Cost 
I calculate per hectare seed cost in each region for three different intensity levels: 
low, high, and actual intensity. I use crop producer price and yield data from FAOSTAT, 
and seeding rate from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) and 
from reports of various university extension services in the US. There are a number of 
factors that affect seed cost that I did not include because of lack of data.  For example, I 
did not consider different seeding rate of a crop in each region as a function of soil 
condition and climate.  
I assume that low intensity agriculture does not use hybrid seed and calculate the 
opportunity cost of using seed from previous year’s harvest. I calculate per hectare low 
intensity seed cost by multiplying each crop’s seeding rate per hectare in the US by the 
producer price of each crop in country i.  
For high intensity seed cost, I assume that the price of seed determines the seed 
cost more than the seeding rate does, and use the relative price of seed compared to that 
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in the US to adjust the seed cost in the US. I divide all crops into two different categories: 
self-pollinated and cross-pollinated crops.  
Self-pollinated: barley, wheat, rice, potato, soybean, sunflower 
Cross-pollinated: maize, oil palm, rapeseed, rye, sugar beet, sugarcane 
For self-pollinated crops, a high percentage of farmers use seeds saved from harvest for 
planting the next crop and do not purchase commercial seeds. According to the survey of 
International Seed Federation (ISF), about 68% of farmers used their own seed for cereals 
in 14 countries that included Canada, China, Italy, Finland, and U.K. (ISF 2005). I use 
the relative average producer price of crop, which is the price of self-pollinated seeds 
saved from the previous harvest season, to adjust the US seed cost for high intensity seed 
cost for self-pollinated crops.   
Seeds for cross-pollinated crops are more likely to be purchased. For cross-
pollinated crops I assume that the seed price is the import price for seed, and adjust the 
seed cost in the US using the relative ratio of average per ton import price of all seeds in 
the US and in each country in 2012. The available producer price of crop data for each 
country between 2001 and 2010 are expressed in 2010 US dollars using the equation (1) 
and inconsistent observations have been excluded as is explained in the general method 
section. The MAD method using 2 as a cut-off value excluded 862 observations out of 
7,244 observations (using 3 as a cut-off value excludes 411 observations).  
I set actual intensity seed cost equal to the high intensity seed cost if the average 
yield in a country i is greater than or equal to the yield of US. Otherwise, I adjust the 
calculated high intensity production seed cost by the ratio of yield of a crop in the country 
compared to the yield of the crop in the US.  
 
Low intensity cost per ha 
The low intensity production seed cost for the production of crop k in region j, Xn_¦W9, 
is calculated using the weighted average of per hectare low intensity seed cost of all 
countries in the region for the production of crop k in 2010 US dollars. The low intensity 
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production seed cost for the production of crop k in country i, Xn_¦W , is calculated by 
using seeding rate and producer price of the crop. I use the following formula: 
 Xn_¦W9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 ¦§WklW  nℎZpZ  W = 1m ( W
	
W  nℎZpZ 2006 ≥ r ≥ 2001 tLuℎ Iℎ`I m ≥ 2 
(14) 
where ¦§Wkl is per hectare seeding rate of crop k in the US in metric ton from Table 3-4; W  is the average per metric ton of price of crop k of country i in 2010 US dollars; m is 
the number of positive observations in country i between year k and 2010; W  is per 
metric ton producer price of crop k of country i in year t expressed in 2010 US dollars. 
 
High intensity cost per ha 
The high intensity production seed cost for the production of crop k in region j, 
_ℎ_¦W9, is calculated using the weighted average of per hectare high intensity seed 
cost of all countries in the region for the production of crop k in 2010 US dollars. It is 
calculated by adjusting per hectare seed cost in the US using average per ton import price 
of all seeds as a weight. The following formula is used to estimate _ℎ_¦W :  
 _ℎ_¦W9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 ¦Wkl
WWkl 
nℎZpZ W = W  `a Wkl = Wkl, if k=self-pollination crop  W = ¨  `a Wkl = ¨kl, if k=cross-pollination crop 
(15) 
where ¦Wkl is the average per hectare seed cost for the production of crop k in the US 
collected from USDA ERS and other university extension data; ¨ is the average per ton 
import price of all seeds of country i in 2012; ¨kl is the average import price of all seed 
in the US in 2012.  
Actual cost per ha  
I divide countries into two categories: high-yield and low-yield countries and apply 
different rules. I define high-yield countries as those with yield of a crop k higher than 
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that in the US. For high-yield countries, I assume that the actual seed cost is equal to the 
high intensity seed cost. For low-yield countries, the actual production seed cost is 
calculated by adjusting high intensity seed cost by the ratio of yield of a crop in the 
region compared to the yield of the crop in the US. I use the following formula to 
calculate weighted average of per hectare actual production seed cost for crop k in region 
j, uIL`¡_¦W9  as: 
 uIL`¡_¦W9 = ( ∑ WwvWbW	∑ ∑ WwvWbW	C
C
	 uIL`¡_¦W , nℎZpZ 
uIL`¡_¦W = ©_ℎ_¦W
 , _ vW /ℎ` ≥ vWkl/ℎ` 
_ℎ_¦W vW /ℎ`vWkl/ℎ` , IℎZpn_tZ  
(16) 
where _ℎ_¦W  is per hectare machinery cost for the production of crop k of country i 
from equation (15); 
% // is relative average per hectare yield for production of crop k in 
country i to that in the US from equation (10). 
 
III. Validation of the Constructed Data 
 
In this section I use existing country- and crop-specific production cost data set to test the 
validity of the constructed data set. I use wheat production cost both at country and 
regional level as an example. I compare the constructed cost values for wheat against 
values from CIMMYT and FADN. Overall, most of the constructed cost values are not 
unreasonably high or low compared to values from CIMMYT and FADN. The regional 
weighted averages relatively match better than individual countries’ values. The 
comparison is done for the purpose of getting a general idea on the validity of the data set 
constructed using the methods described above. Methods and data used by CIMMYT and 
FADN differ so we would not expect an exact matching but large differences raise doubts 
about accuracy of the various data sets.  
I compare the constructed cost of wheat production in my data set and other data 
sets in countries and regions that are commonly available in both data sets. Wheat is one 
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of the most widely produced crops in the world and thus has a good data coverage across 
the globe. I use readily available data from the International Wheat and Maize 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT), and the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) from 
European Commission data sets for the comparison of wheat production cost. I mainly 
use these two data sets to compare with my constructed data set because they are the most 
comprehensive and consistent data sets available. The values from CIMMYT are 
collected using the literature and based on the experts’ opinions, and are published in 
“Wheat Facts and Futures 2009 (Dixon et al. 2009).” Not all values represent actual cost 
estimates from survey data. The CIMMYT data set represents the cost per hectare for 
“bread wheat production using commercial seed” in 2009. If there are multiple values for 
each cost item because of different management practices in the CIMMYT data set, I 
calculated average of cost values from all management practices. The values from FADN 
are from survey data that are consistent across the European Union countries, where 
available. I calculated average of available values between 2006 and 2010. All the values 
used for validation from CIMMYT and FADN have been converted using the same price 
conversion method outlined in equation (1). 
I took weighted average of per hectare cost of wheat production for each cost 
using total value of agricultural product,  ∑ Pª«QªM­ª	  from equation (4) in country i. 
Then, I compare country-specific cost values from my data set to those from the 
CIMMYT and FADN data sets. I calculated how much the CIMMYT or FADN values 
are higher or lower compared to the values from my constructed values as a percentage of 
the constructed value. This value is represented as the “Diff (%)” column in Tables 3-
5,6,7, and 8. I define the difference as being large if the absolute value of the difference is 
higher than 50%. 
Table 3-5 compares per hectare fertilizer cost for wheat production between my 
data set and CIMMYT data set. Overall, the regional averages match better between 
constructed and CIMMYT values than do the country specific values. Country specific 
comparisons show some extreme values such as Kyrgyzstan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. 
These countries have significantly lower constructed values compared to the CIMMYT 
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values because of low N, P, and K application rates when compared to other countries 
within the same region. South America, Eastern and Northern Europe have relatively 
larger difference between constructed and CIMMYT values, while the regional weighted 
average of constructed values for all countries in European Union matches well with that 
of the CIMMYT values. In South America, Argentina and Brazil have significantly lower 
constructed values than those of the CIMMYT because Argentina has zero K application 
and Brazil has relatively lower prices for all fertilizer items and low N application rate 
compared to other countries. Norway has significantly high constructed value because of 
relatively high use of K fertilizer compared to other European countries. Among 
countries with absolute value of difference more than 50%, the constructed values 
underestimate the fertilizer cost in South American and Asian countries compared to the 
CIMMYT values. The comparison of constructed values and values from FADN shows 
that my constructed values in Europe tend to be closer to the estimates from FADN than 
are the estimates from CIMMYT (e.g., estimates in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and 
Germany). 
Table 3-6 compares per hectare labor costs for wheat production between my data 
set and the CIMMYT and FADN data sets. The weighted regional averages in Central 
and South America for the constructed data set match well with the CIMMYT data. 
Argentina has an extremely low constructed value compared to the CIMMYT value. 
Argentina’s low value of labor cost comes from low constructed value of labor quantity, 
which is lower than the other countries in South America and similar to that in the US. 
The reason that the labor quantity value is similar to that in the US is because wheat yield 
and agricultural productivity in Argentina are comparable to those in the US, i.e., 
adjustment factors in equation (8) are close to 1. The regional average of constructed 
value in Central Asia is significantly different from the value from CIMMYT because 
there is only one observation, Kazakhstan, in my constructed dataset.  
The constructed values in European countries are closer to the values from FADN 
than are the CIMMYT values, except for Italy, which has significantly high labor cost 
compared to the other European countries. Italy’s unpaid labor cost per hectare 
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production of wheat is about 9-10 times higher than that in France. Poland and Austria’s 
values match better with the values from FADN.  CIMMYT underestimate the labor cost 
compared to the values from FADN in both countries. 
Table 3-7 compares per hectare machinery cost for wheat production between my 
data set and CIMMYT and FADN. I summed soil preparation and harvest costs from 
CIMMYT data set to compare to the constructed machinery cost in my data set. The 
values represented here are high machinery cost values for the countries that have per 
hectare machinery usage greater than that in the US, adjusting the US machinery cost 
using the relative list price of machines in country i compared to the list price in the US. 
Therefore, the constructed values reflect the differences in the price of machines 
compared to that in the US.  
The constructed values in Eastern and Western Asia countries have values similar 
to those from CIMMYT, with differences less than 50%. Out of 14 countries that have 
values commonly available in both data sets of constructed and CIMMYT, four 
countries’ constructed values, i.e., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, and Switzerland, are 
significantly different from values from CIMMYT. Among those countries, the 
constructed values of all countries except Switzerland are higher than the values from 
CIMMYT. These high values come from the fact that these countries have relatively 
higher prices of tractor, combine, and plow compared to the prices of those in the US in 
the FAO data set. 
The comparison with FADN data set shows that five out of nine countries’ 
constructed values are closer matches than are the CIMMYT values: Hungary, Poland, 
Lithuania, Italy, and Germany.  
Table 3-8 compares per hectare high intensity seed cost for wheat production 
between my constructed data set and other data sets from CIMMYT and FADN. I 
compare the constructed high intensity seed cost to the values from CIMMYT because 
CIMMYT values are for production of wheat using commercial seeds. High intensity cost 
was calculated adjusting the seed cost in the US using relative producer prices in each 
country compared to those in the US. The differences in the constructed seed costs reflect 
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the difference of producer prices in each country compared to those in the US. For 
example, high constructed seed cost in Rwanda reflects high price of wheat in Rwanda 
compared to that in the US. 
Overall, the differences between the constructed values and the CIMMYT values 
are more prevalent for European countries compared to the rest of the countries while 
most of the constructed values are similar to the values from FADN. The weighted 
regional averages in South America and South Asia using constructed values are very 
similar to the weighted regional average using CIMMYT values. Comparing the 
constructed values to the values from FADN, I find that all constructed values in 
European countries except Germany and Spain are closer to the values from FADN.  
 
IV. Comparison between Profit and Revenue 
 
Comparison of revenue and profit maps from wheat production using Figures 3-1, 3-2, 
and 3-3 highlights two points. Firstly, many areas with high revenue appear to have 
negative profits when using the constructed wheat production cost data. Secondly, there 
is a shift in regions where the profit from wheat production is the highest compared to 
where production of wheat brings the most revenue.  
Comparing changes in color schemes in Figure 3-1 and 3-2 suggests that using 
revenue as the economic rent measurement not only presents regions with negative profit 
as having high economic returns but also changes the relative value of the economic rent 
from wheat production among different regions of the world. The regions that appear to 
have high revenues while profit becomes negative include the following regions: 
Americas (central US, southern Canada, northeastern and southern Peru), Europe (Spain, 
Italy, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey, and Russian Federation), and Asia (southern India, 
western China, and South Korea). The use of revenue as the measure of profit will 
indicate these regions as areas with high profit when it is actually not profitable to grow 
wheat. The regions where relative value of economic rent changes are as follows. In the 
Americas, some parts of the western US, Mexico, Columbia, Chile, and Argentina have 
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high revenue from wheat production while only the western US appears to have high 
profit in the Americas. In Europe, most countries in eastern Europe(Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland Russian Federation), western Europe (France, 
Germany, Netherlands), and northern Europe (UK, Ireland, Lithuania) have high revenue, 
but none of these areas appears to have high profits. Many Sub-Saharan African 
countries, including Nigeria, Chad, Madagascar, Namibia, and Zambia also have high 
revenues, while only Madagascar, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe seem to have high 
profits. In Asia, India, China, Turkey and Pakistan have high revenue from wheat 
production, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, northern India, and 
eastern China have high profits from wheat production.  
Miscalculation of profit due to the omission of production costs can lead to 
inefficient land-use decisions. For example, as seen in Figure 3-1, using revenue as profit 
shows that many European and Sub-Saharan African countries have comparable profit 
per hectare. Using this result would seem to indicate that the cost of conserving one 
hectare of land in these regions is the same. In contrast, Figure 3-2 using correctly 
calculated profit and shows that Sub-Saharan African countries have higher profit, 
represented by darker colors, compared to the European countries. This means that 
European countries would have higher priority for conservation if both European and 
Sub-Saharan African countries have the same value of other ecosystem services because 
the cost of conservation is lower in European countries.  
The regions with high profits in the US, northern India, and eastern China, as seen 
in the profit map, reflect actual high wheat production areas. The areas with high revenue 
from the revenue map of Figure 3-1 highlight areas that are not major wheat producing 
areas. The areas with high fraction of land in wheat production, as seen in Figure 3-3, 
represent regions in each country which have a high percentage of wheat cultivation. It 
shows that the central US, southern Canada, eastern Argentina, northern Kazakhstan, 
northern India, and eastern China, western Australia have higher percentages of land 
under wheat cultivation than the rest of the world. These regions appear to be consistent 
with the areas with high profit (i.e., Eastern Argentina, northern India, and eastern China) 
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from Figure 2, except for some regions (i.e., central US, southern Canada), which are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
V. Discussion 
 
There is an increasing need for the valuation of ecosystem services and for evaluating 
tradeoffs among them as we face challenges to use land more efficiently. Successful 
implementation of any land-use policies to increase net benefits is significantly affected 
by whether we use the correct value of benefits and costs associated with alternative land-
use scenarios.  
There has been an increasing availability of global data sets that can be used for 
valuation of ecosystem services such as global carbon sequestration, hydrology, and 
elevation data sets. However, I find that an important and very basic component is 
missing when evaluating the opportunity cost of taking land out of crop production: 
agricultural production cost. There has not been a development of globally consistent 
production cost data set in the production economics literature. This caused many studies 
in other fields outside of economics to use revenue as a measurement for profit to value 
the opportunity cost of taking land out of production. Specifically, many studies in 
conservation planning literature have referenced Naidoo and Iwamura (2008) which 
measures revenue.  
In this paper, I constructed a globally consistent agricultural production cost data 
set to include the data for the calculation of profit. After the validation of the constructed 
data set by comparing the values from it to those of other data sets, I compared values 
between the estimated profit and revenue. The comparison showed how much difference 
it makes to use profit instead of revenue. The results highlighted the importance of 
including the production cost in measuring profit because using the cost data enables us 
to identify areas with negative profit. Also, relative values of the profit changed as I 
include the production cost. When combined with other ecosystem services such as 
carbon, identification of areas with negative profit will make a significant difference in 
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calculating net benefits/costs. The difference will change the tradeoffs between 
agricultural production and other ecosystem services and change our land-use decisions 
that maximize net benefits.  
The construction of globally consistent production cost data through this study 
was a first attempt to provide production cost data for different crops globally. The 
documentation of methods and data used provides a base for other studies to improve 
upon the current cost data. There remains much that can be done to improve estimates of 
production cost. There is a pressing need for concerted efforts among agricultural 
production economists to provide globally consistent production cost data set.  
 There is a need for better use and integration of national and sub-national 
statistics to improve production cost estimates in particular regions. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 
show that there are some areas where there is a discrepancy between high profit and high 
fraction of wheat harvested areas. For example, most of the areas in the Russian 
Federation have negative profit from wheat production, which could be because Russia’s 
constructed production cost is higher than its actual production cost. Figure 3-4 shows 
that Russia has a higher production cost than central Asian countries (e.g., Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) that are close to areas with a high fraction of wheat 
production in Russia. The production cost in Russia was calculated using regional 
average of fertilizer and labor costs due to the lack of country-level values, as indicated 
by low level of data quality in Figure 3-2. The regional average cost of fertilizer and 
labor in Eastern Europe, where Russia is a part of, might be higher than the level of those 
costs in Russia, leading to the negative profit. Improvement of the current cost data with 
more detailed regional information combined with sub-national scale data will make the 
assessment of cost finer in scale, compatible with the 5 minute by 5 minute yield data 
used in the yield data. It will provide more accurate calculation of the opportunity cost of 
land for more efficient land-use decisions at a finer resolution. 
This data set did not factor in agricultural policies including subsidies for farmers. 
Subsidies can significantly change the profitability of crop production. In the US, both 
the Northern Great Plains and Prairie Gateway farm resource regions, as defined by 
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USDA ERS (ERS 2000), have high fraction of wheat harvested area (Figure 3-3) but 
have negative profit from wheat production (Figure 3-2). This result may occur because 
subsidies make it profitable for farmers to grow wheat. The profitability of wheat in the 
US has been declining over the past two decades because of low price from competition 
with foreign countries and less investment in research compared to other crops (ERS 
2013). The value of wheat production less total cost in the US had been negative between 
2004 and 2010 except for the year 2008 according to the farm budget report by USDA 
(ERS 2015a). In the central US, some areas previously dominated by wheat have 
switched to more profitable crops such as corn (Beddow and Pardey 2015). Wheat 
farmers in the US are largely subsidized by the government through various programs 
such as loan deficiency payment and direct payment (ERS 2015b). Consideration of 
governmental subsidies will give better information on farmers’ profitability, which then 
provides a better sense of values that drive farmers’ actual cropping decisions.  
The improvement of the current constructed cost data to include more 
comprehensive list of crops at a finer resolution will increase the accuracy of production 
costs. It will enable more accurate assessment of benefits and costs from various land-use 
scenarios. My constructed data set also attempts to calculate costs by different 
agricultural intensity levels, i.e., high and low. Such efforts can help answer other 
research questions on the benefits and costs of agricultural intensification when combined 
with other biophysical models such as the yield model.  
 Despite its limitations, this study improves upon currently existing method of 
using revenue as an alternative calculation of profit and contributes both to the 
production economics and land-use planning literature. The evidence from Figures 3-1,3-
2, and 3-3 showed that areas with high profits reflect the areas with high fraction of 
wheat harvested area better than the areas with high revenue. The constructed production 
cost data set provided by this study combined with other biophysical and socioeconomic 
data sets will help improve assessment of benefits and costs from agricultural production 
and other ecosystem services for more efficient use of land. 
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  Calculation of profit using the constructed cost data set will also help inform 
land-use decisions such as those under the United Nation’s program on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD). The information can 
be used to estimate how much we should compensate farmers for taking land out of crop 
production in the regions with relatively low value of agricultural production and high 
value of other ecosystem services. 
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Table 3-1. Description of available unit cost ($/unit) and quantity data (unit/ha) for cost 
per ha calculation 
 Unit cost ($/unit) Quantity (unit/ha) Data source 
Fertilizer Most recent 5 years’ 
average unit cost of N, P, 
and K paid by producers 
between 1993-2002 in 
constant 2010 US dollars 
($/kg) adjusted for price 
increase from 1990s to 
2010s using US unit costs. 
Actual application rates 
per hectare along with 
low or high intensity 
application rates of N, P, 
and K for different crops 
(kg/ha) between 1997 and 
2003 
FAO, 
Mueller et 
al. (2012) 
Labor Most recent 5 years’ 
average hourly wage rate of 
male agricultural paid and 
unpaid workers between 
1990 and 2008 in constant 
2010 US dollars ($/hour) 
Hours of labor required 
for the production of crop 
per hectare (hours/ha) 
estimated by adjusting the 
labor quantity data in the 
US between 2006 and 
2010 
FAO, ILO, 
NBER, 
USDA-ERS 
Machinery For high intensity production, I used average machinery 
cost in the US between 2006 and 2010 in constant 2010 
US dollars ($/ha) adjusted by most recent 5 years’ 
average import price of combine, tractor, and plow 
between 2000 and 2009 in a country. Actual intensity is 
equal to high intensity if number of machines in use per 
hectare is greater than or equal to that in the US. 
Otherwise, actual intensity is estimated by adjusting high 
intensity machinery cost in a country by relative number 
of machines in use per hectare in the country to that in 
the US. I assume that there are zero machinery costs for 
low intensity production.   
FAO, 
USDA-ERS 
 
Seed For high intensity production, I used average seed cost in 
the US ($/ha) adjusted by average of most recent 5 years’ 
producer price of crops between 2001 and 2010 or 
import seed prices in a country depending on the crop 
type: self-pollination and cross-pollination.  For actual 
intensity I adjust high intensity costs by relative yield of 
a country compared to that in the US. For low intensity I 
use crop price in each region ($/kg) and seeding rate 
(kg/ha) to calculate the opportunity cost of using seed 
from previous year’s harvest.   
FAO, 
USDA-
ERS, ISF, 
University 
extension 
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Table 3-2. List of countries in each region 
Continent Region Countries 
Africa Eastern 
Africa 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, 
Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Central 
Africa 
Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe 
Northern 
Africa 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Western Sahara 
Southern 
Africa 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland 
Western 
Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Americas Caribbean Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, 
Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin (French part), Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin 
Islands 
Central 
America 
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama 
South 
America 
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French 
Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
Northern 
America 
Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 
United States of America 
Asia Central 
Asia 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Eastern 
Asia 
China, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
China, Macao Special Administrative Region, Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of 
Korea 
Southern 
Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of), Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
South-
Eastern 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
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Asia Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam 
Western 
Asia 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
Europe Eastern 
Europe 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Ukraine 
Northern 
Europe 
Åland Islands, Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe 
Islands, Finland, Guernsey, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, 
Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sark, Svalbard and Jan 
Mayen Islands, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
Southern 
Europe 
Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, 
Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Western 
Europe 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland 
Oceania Oceania Australia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Fiji, New Caledonia, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Guam, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), 
Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, American Samoa, 
Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands 
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Table 3-3. Conversion rate used by FAO to calculate per metric ton of plant nutrient for 
N, P, and K from fertilizer commodity unit cost 
Nutrient (n) Commodity Conversion Factor 
N 
Ammonium sulfate 21% N 
Urea 46% N 
P 
Single superphosphate 18% P2O5 
Superphosphate 46% P2O5 
K 
Potassium sulfate 50% K2O 
Muriate over 45% 60% K2O 
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Table 3-4. Seeding rate of crops in the US 
Crop 
Seeding rate (tons per 100 ha) 
(¦§Wkl) 
Wheat 10.5 
Rice 9.8 
Corn 2.2 
Soybean 8.1 
Barley 5.7 
Sugar beet 0.2 
Sunflower 0.4 
Rapeseed 0.6 
Rye 16.7 
Potato 308.9 
Source: Wheat, rice, corn, soybean, and barely data are from USDA ARMS survey and 
data for the other crops are from Purdue and Missouri university extension websites. 
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Table 3-5. Comparison of per hectare fertilizer cost for wheat production data values 
between constructed data set and CIMMYT and FADN data sets 
Region/Country Constructed CIMMYT FADN 
Fert Cost/ha Fert Cost/ha Diff (%) Fert Cost/ha Diff (%) 
Southern Africa 146 131 -10    
South Africa 146 131 -10    
South America 127 195 54    
Argentina 66 167 151    
Brazil 128 216 69    
Peru 152 167 10    
Uruguay 156 176 13    
Central Asia 25 163 540    
Kyrgyzstan 25 85 233    
Eastern Asia 598 375 -37    
China 460 376 -18    
Southern Asia 239 209 -12    
Bangladesh 92 229 148    
Nepal 45 590 1223    
Pakistan 338 261 -23    
Western Asia 126 156 24    
Turkey 122 166 36    
Eastern Europe 163 257 58     
Hungary 183 250 37 129 -29  
Czech Rep. 208 171 -18 135 -35  
Poland 256 303 19 265 4 
Northern Europe 192 291 52     
Norway 648 156 -76     
Southern Europe 207 189 -8     
Italy 229 325 42 105 -54 
Portugal 228 130 -43    
Spain 209 78 -62 81 -61 
Western Europe 197 113 -42     
France 196 166 -15 171  -13 
Germany 167 50 -70 179 7 
Switzerland 204 255 25     
European Union 205 178 -13     
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Table 3-6. Comparison of per hectare labor cost for wheat production data values 
between constructed data set and CIMMYT and FADN data sets 
Region/Country Constructed CIMMYT FADN 
Labor 
cost/ha 
Labor 
cost/ha 
Diff (%) Labor 
cost/ha 
Diff (%) 
Eastern Africa 177 117 -34  
Madagascar 155 42 -73  
Rwanda 244 398 63  
Central America 158 111 30  
Mexico 158 111 -30  
South America 65 67 4  
Argentina 12 33 172  
Brazil 76 71 -6  
Peru 182 219 20  
Central Asia 10 75 643  
Kazakhstan 10 13 31  
Eastern Asia 354 218 -38  
China 354 219 -38  
Southern Asia 95 161 69  
Bangladesh 209 539 159  
Pakistan 37 89 142  
Eastern Europe 152 43 -72  
Poland 198 47 -76 338 -71 
Southern Europe 150 208 39  
Italy 154 398 158 1120 -627 
Western Europe 213 61 -71  
Austria 216 108 -50 173 20 
Belgium 154 24 -84  
European Union 191 142 -26  
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Table 3-7. Comparison of per hectare machinery cost for wheat production data values 
between constructed data set and CIMMYT and FADN data sets 
Region/Country Constructed CIMMYT FADN 
Machinery 
cost/ha 
Machinery 
cost/ha 
Diff (%) Machinery 
cost/ha 
Diff (%) 
Eastern Asia 439 537 22   
China 444 538 21   
Western Asia 561 438 -22   
Georgia 415 224 -46   
Turkey 664 471 -29   
Eastern Europe 547 282 -48   
Bulgaria 800 313 -61 276 66 
Hungary 328 338 3 290 12 
Czech Rep. 749 368 -51 422 44 
Poland 335 241 -28 405 -21 
Northern Europe 277 499 80   
Lithuania 386 547 41 314 19 
Norway 302 360 19   
Southern Europe 238 258 8   
Italy 331 470 42 402 -21 
Spain 240 79 -67 144 40 
Western Europe 301 317 5   
Austria 177 210 19 287 -62 
Germany 361 304 -16 342 5 
Switzerland 386 877 127   
European Union 327 278 -15   
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Table 3-8. Comparison of per hectare high intensity seed cost for wheat production data 
values between constructed data set and CIMMYT and FADN data sets (high intensity) 
Region/Country Constructed CIMMYT FADN 
Seed cost/ha Seed cost/ha Diff (%) Seed cost/ha Diff (%) 
Eastern Africa 217 280 29   
Rwanda 304 132 -57   
Southern Africa 118 69 -41   
South Africa 118 69 -41   
Central America 75 146 95   
Mexico 75 146 95   
South America 91 88 -4   
Argentina 77 40 -48   
Brazil 74 112 52   
Peru 147 130 -11   
Uruguay 95 78 -17   
Central Asia 105 139 33   
Kazakhstan 60 67 11   
Kyrgyzstan 136 233 72   
Tajikistan 192 227 18   
Eastern Asia 306 124 -59   
Mongolia 122 114 -7   
China 116 124 7   
Southern Asia 160 149 -7   
Bangladesh 169 190 13   
Nepal 146 190 30   
Pakistan 157 155 -1   
Western Asia 140 125 -11   
Georgia 118 214 81   
Turkey 137 129 -6   
Eastern Europe 80 131 62   
Bulgaria 102 148 46 93 -9 
Hungary 69 134 94 71 3 
Czech Rep. 65 110 69 85 30 
Poland 77 130 69 81 6 
Northern Europe 45 136 205   
Lithuania 84 135 60 79 -7 
Norway 64 139 118   
Southern Europe 60 99 66   
Italy 54 123 125 85 56 
Portugal 58 98 68   
Spain 56 78 40 66 18 
Western Europe 40 83 108   
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Austria 33 72 115 63 89 
France 39 69 77 51 30 
Germany 39 85 121 65 68 
Switzerland 85 277 226   
Belgium 38 102 165   
European Union 55 100 81   
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Figure 3-1. Revenue per hectare from planting wheat, calculated by average price between 2006 and 2010 times average yield 
between 1997 and 2003, in 2010 US dollar value 
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Figure 3-2. Profit per hectare from planting wheat, calculated by average price between 2006 and 2010 times average yield between 
1997 and 2003 subtracting per hectare cost of wheat production, in 2010 US dollar value and cost data quality index 
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Figure 3-3. Fraction of wheat harvested area over total area in a given cell around the world (some areas have values over 1 because of 
double cropping) 
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Figure 3-4. Production cost per hectare from planting wheat in 2010 US dollars 
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Appendix 
 
Regional Averages of Constructed Cost by Crop 
 
Here I show regional weighted averages of constructed cost by crop using the methods 
presented in the II. Construction of the Global Production Cost Data in Chapter 3. In each 
table, I display how many observations in each region were used to calculate the 
averages, which demonstrates the representativeness of the value for the region. If there 
is no observation (Obs = 0) within the region, then the value is substituted for the 
weighted average of countries of a bigger region of which the region is a subset. No 
values (“.”) indicate that there is no observation in the region and in the bigger region 
because either there is no baseline data or there is no data for adjustment factors. I also 
present how much percentage each cost item occupies in total cost for the crop 
production.  
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Table 1. Weighted averages of wheat production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region  
Wheat Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery 
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low Actual  
Eastern Africa 3 110 (25) 3 113 (25) 0 74 (17) 3 601 3 148 (33) 217 91 445 
Central Africa 1 65 (15) 2 157 (36) 0 74 (17) 1 410 0 143 (33) 181 76 439 
Northern Africa 2 389 (62) 4 12 (2) 4 80 (13) 5 184 5 146 (23) 178 74 627 
Southern Africa 1 146 (43) 0 38 (11) 1 43 (12) 1 454 1 116 (34) 118 49 344 
Northern America 2 103 (24) 2 56 (13) 2 226 (53) 2 265 2 46 (11) 46 19 431 
Central America 0 127 (29) 1 158 (36) 0 76 (17) 1 164 1 75 (17) 75 31 436 
South America 6 127 (38) 5 65 (19) 4 76 (23) 10 508 9 67 (20) 91 38 334 
Central Asia 1 25 (15) 1 10 (6) 2 66 (39) 2 549 3 67 (40) 105 44 169 
Eastern Asia 2 598 (35) 1 380 (22) 4 439 (26) 4 439 2 300 (17) 306 128 1717 
Southern Asia 3 239 (59) 2 33 (8) 2 3 (1) 3 114 4 131 (32) 160 67 406 
South-Eastern 
Asia 2 518 (67) 0 61 (8) 1 68 (9) 1 68 0 131 (17) 160 67 779 
Western Asia 3 126 (15) 2 25 (3) 7 561 (68) 9 539 8 108 (13) 140 58 820 
Eastern Europe 4 163 (17) 3 152 (16) 8 547 (59) 8 719 8 72 (8) 80 34 934 
Northern Europe 6 192 (24) 4 295 (36) 8 277 (34) 9 379 9 45 (6) 45 19 809 
Southern Europe 4 207 (32) 2 150 (23) 9 238 (36) 10 267 9 60 (9) 60 25 654 
Western Europe 4 197 (26) 3 213 (28) 7 301 (40) 7 301 7 40 (5) 40 17 751 
Oceania 1 103 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 435 1 21 (.) 45 19  
European Union 15 205 (27) 13 191 (25) 25 318 (41) 26 333 26 54 (7) 55 23 768 
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Table 2. Weighted averages of rice production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Rice Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low Actual  
Eastern Africa 3 78 (11) 3 285 (39) 0 188 (26) 3 1477 5 171 (24) 454 97 722 
Central Africa 1 54 (9) 2 148 (23) 0 188 (30) 1 1008 0 239 (38) 414 89 630 
Northern Africa 2 286 (34) 3 20 (2) 3 207 (25) 4 455 2 329 (39) 419 90 842 
Southern Africa 1 364 (47) 0 73 (9) 1 105 (13) 1 1115 0 239 (31) 414 89 782 
Western Africa 2 15 (2) 1 575 (66) 0 188 (22) 2 541 4 92 (11) 297 64 870 
Northern America 1 224 (22) 1 163 (16) 1 519 (50) 1 624 1 137 (13) 137 29 1043 
Central America 0 115 (7) 4 136 (8) 1 1,368 (80) 4 516 5 96 (6) 166 35 1715 
Caribbean 2 252 (.) 1 455 (.) 0 . (.) 2 1425 1 440 (.) 724 155  
South America 6 115 (20) 6 164 (28) 4 186 (32) 10 1248 9 118 (20) 199 43 584 
Central Asia 1 35 (7) 1 35 (7) 2 163 (33) 2 1348 3 257 (53) 596 128 489 
Eastern Asia 2 427 (13) 1 835 (26) 3 1,080 (34) 3 1080 2 852 (27) 984 211 3193 
Southern Asia 4 139 (43) 3 71 (22) 2 7 (2) 4 274 4 107 (33) 219 47 324 
South-Eastern 
Asia 4 235 (15) 4 285 (18) 3 914 (59) 5 889 5 117 (8) 239 51 1550 
Western Asia 1 142 (6) 0 202 (8) 1 1,632 (65) 1 1632 1 523 (21) 537 115 2499 
Eastern Europe 3 138 (8) 1 109 (6) 5 1,285 (76) 5 1840 2 163 (10) 257 55 1695 
Southern Europe 4 220 (16) 2 307 (23) 4 656 (49) 4 685 0 163 (12) 257 55 1346 
Western Europe 2 120 (9) 0 247 (19) 1 799 (60) 1 799 0 163 (12) 257 55 1330 
Oceania 1 113 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 1069 1 119 (.) 119 26  
European Union 7 194 (15) 3 247 (19) 8 781 (60) 8 797 7 74 (6) 95 20 1296 
 
 116 
 
Table 3. Weighted averages of barley production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Barley Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low Actual  
Eastern Africa 2 138 (41) 0 7 (2) 0 110 (33) 2 838 2 81 (24) 145 42 336 
Northern Africa 2 298 (62) 3 7 (1) 3 125 (26) 4 209 4 49 (10) 114 33 479 
Southern Africa 1 101 (44) 0 7 (3) 1 53 (23) 1 562 1 68 (30) 88 25 229 
Northern America 2 76 (17) 2 65 (14) 2 280 (62) 2 328 2 35 (8) 35 10 456 
Central America 0 78 (30) 1 72 (28) 0 67 (26) 1 203 1 41 (16) 60 17 258 
South America 6 78 (30) 4 73 (28) 3 67 (26) 8 630 8 38 (15) 55 16 256 
Central Asia 1 6 (5) 1 11 (8) 2 82 (64) 2 679 3 29 (23) 67 19 128 
Eastern Asia 2 511 (34) 1 275 (18) 4 543 (36) 4 544 3 180 (12) 209 60 1509 
Southern Asia 3 168 (81) 2 12 (6) 2 4 (2) 3 142 3 23 (11) 92 26 207 
South-Eastern 
Asia 2 179 (52) 0 34 (10) 1 84 (24) 1 84 0 49 (14) 103 30 346 
Western Asia 3 99 (12) 2 14 (2) 7 695 (81) 9 667 6 51 (6) 87 25 858 
Eastern Europe 4 90 (10) 3 115 (13) 8 678 (74) 8 890 5 38 (4) 59 17 921 
Northern Europe 6 180 (23) 4 211 (27) 8 343 (44) 9 470 1 45 (6) 45 13 779 
Southern Europe 4 187 (28) 2 141 (21) 9 295 (45) 10 331 7 37 (6) 43 12 659 
Western Europe 4 162 (22) 3 163 (22) 7 373 (51) 7 373 2 29 (4) 29 8 727 
Oceania 1 104 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 539 1 15 (.) 34 10  
European Union 15 168 (23) 13 150 (20) 25 394 (53) 26 412 26 26 (4) 26 8 737 
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Table 4. Weighted averages of maize production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Maize Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low  Actual 
Eastern Africa 3 22 (10) 4 32 (14) 0 105 (46) 4 830 4 69 (30) 349 12 228 
Central Africa 1 55 (14) 2 67 (17) 0 105 (27) 1 561 0 164 (42) 325 13 392 
Northern Africa 2 522 (57) 3 8 (1) 3 115 (13) 4 253 2 276 (30) 388 15 922 
Southern Africa 1 204 (68) 0 19 (6) 1 59 (20) 1 621 1 17 (6) 40 7 298 
Western Africa 2 7 (2) 1 83 (23) 0 105 (29) 2 301 0 164 (46) 325 13 359 
Northern America 2 213 (29) 2 64 (9) 2 310 (42) 2 363 2 152 (21) 153 3 739 
Central America 0 136 (14) 4 31 (3) 1 762 (77) 4 287 3 58 (6) 188 9 987 
Caribbean 2 211 (.) 1 26 (.) 0 . (.) 2 793 0 . (.)    
South America 6 136 (40) 6 44 (13) 4 104 (31) 10 695 5 53 (16) 164 9 337 
Central Asia 1 19 (4) 1 15 (3) 2 91 (19) 2 750 1 359 (74) 750 5 484 
Eastern Asia 2 875 (52) 1 172 (10) 3 601 (36) 3 601 1 24 (1) 47 18 1673 
Southern Asia 4 117 (51) 3 24 (10) 2 4 (2) 4 153 0 83 (36) 165 10 228 
South-Eastern 
Asia 4 227 (26) 4 70 (8) 3 509 (58) 5 495 3 66 (8) 151 8 872 
Western Asia 3 270 (24) 1 5 (0) 6 771 (67) 8 740 5 99 (9) 139 11 1146 
Eastern Europe 4 162 (15) 3 73 (7) 8 749 (69) 8 984 8 102 (9) 208 8 1086 
Northern Europe 0 272 (26) 1 26 (2) 1 529 (51) 1 529 1 202 (20) 202 8 1028 
Southern Europe 4 435 (45) 2 130 (14) 8 326 (34) 9 366 8 73 (8) 93 5 964 
Western Europe 4 229 (26) 3 95 (11) 7 412 (47) 7 412 6 141 (16) 141 4 878 
Oceania 1 94 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 595 1 44 (.) 79 4  
European Union 10 312 (33) 9 95 (10) 17 441 (47) 17 446 16 85 (9) 103 5 933 
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Table 5. Weighted averages of rye production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Rye Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low  Actual 
Northern Africa 2 209 (.) 1 4 (.) 1 30 (.) 2 37 0 . (.)    
Southern Africa 1 85 (.) 0 4 (.) 1 10 (.) 1 111 0 . (.)    
Northern America 2 46 (24) 2 59 (31) 2 55 (29) 2 65 2 32 (17) 32 23 192 
Central America 0 116 (37) 1 149 (47) 0 13 (4) 1 40 1 37 (12) 37 62 315 
South America 5 116 (54) 4 65 (30) 2 13 (6) 6 132 3 21 (10) 34 25 215 
Central Asia 1 41 (25) 1 16 (10) 2 16 (10) 2 134 1 92 (56) 156 32 166 
Eastern Asia 1 624 (80) 0 16 (2) 2 107 (14) 2 107 0 33 (4) 43 60 781 
Southern Asia 1 60 (28) 0 16 (7) 0 109 (50) 0 111 0 33 (15) 43 60 218 
South-Eastern 
Asia 1 420 (73) 0 16 (3) 0 109 (19) 0 111 0 33 (6) 43 60 578 
Western Asia 1 121 (38) 0 16 (5) 3 157 (50) 3 158 1 22 (7) 22 65 316 
Eastern Europe 4 76 (18) 3 180 (42) 8 133 (31) 8 175 8 43 (10) 43 48 433 
Northern Europe 6 167 (24) 4 420 (62) 8 68 (10) 9 92 7 28 (4) 28 27 683 
Southern Europe 4 218 (45) 2 187 (39) 8 58 (12) 9 65 8 19 (4) 19 39 482 
Western Europe 4 112 (25) 3 243 (53) 7 73 (16) 7 73 7 30 (6) 30 25 458 
Oceania 1 103 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 106 0 . (.)    
European Union 15 149 (31) 12 237 (49) 23 78 (16) 24 81 22 22 (4) 22 35 486 
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Table 6. Weighted averages of potato production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Potato Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low  Actual 
Eastern Africa 3 92 (14) 4 85 (13) 0 121 (19) 4 993 6 348 (54) 2212 1620 645 
Central Africa 1 104 (6) 2 83 (5) 0 121 (7) 1 671 0 1,426 (82) 3408 2496 1734 
Northern Africa 2 907 (31) 4 25 (1) 4 131 (4) 5 301 5 1,862 (64) 4023 2946 2925 
Southern Africa 1 
1,237 
(46) 0 38 (1) 1 70 (3) 1 743 1 1,343 (50) 1783 1305 2688 
Western Africa 1 73 (3) 0 38 (1) 0 121 (5) 1 369 2 2,365 (91) 5787 4238 2597 
Northern America 2 372 (23) 2 131 (8) 2 371 (23) 2 434 2 763 (47) 786 576 1637 
Central America 0 485 (14) 4 112 (3) 1 911 (26) 4 344 5 1,951 (56) 3449 2526 3460 
Caribbean 1 579 (.) 1 501 (.) 0 . (.) 1 987 2 2,234 (.) 4654 3408  
South America 6 485 (29) 5 89 (5) 4 124 (7) 10 831 10 988 (59) 2111 1546 1685 
Central Asia 1 49 (4) 1 21 (2) 2 108 (10) 2 898 3 953 (84) 2473 1811 1131 
Eastern Asia 2 629 (18) 1 546 (15) 4 718 (20) 4 718 3 1,667 (47) 2688 1969 3560 
Southern Asia 4 521 (37) 3 51 (4) 2 5 (0) 4 183 5 838 (59) 2234 1636 1415 
South-Eastern 
Asia 4 350 (15) 2 201 (8) 3 609 (25) 3 609 4 1,228 (51) 3337 2444 2388 
Western Asia 3 548 (17) 2 43 (1) 7 919 (29) 9 881 8 1,649 (52) 2784 2038 3159 
Eastern Europe 4 165 (7) 3 138 (6) 8 896 (40) 8 1177 8 1,069 (47) 2106 1542 2267 
Northern Europe 6 433 (21) 4 274 (13) 9 451 (21) 10 620 9 944 (45) 961 704 2102 
Southern Europe 4 410 (16) 2 172 (7) 9 389 (15) 10 437 9 1,652 (63) 1864 1365 2623 
Western Europe 4 296 (17) 3 202 (11) 7 493 (27) 7 493 7 803 (45) 806 590 1794 
Oceania 1 387 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 712 1 1,103 (.) 1379 1010  
European Union 15 336 (18) 13 185 (10) 25 521 (28) 26 544 25 816 (44) 1382 1012 1858 
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Table 7. Weighted averages of sugar beet production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Sugar beet Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low  Actual 
Eastern Africa 0 241 (23) 0 23 (2) 0 466 (44) 0 646 1 339 (32) 339 1 1069 
Northern Africa 2 241 (23) 1 23 (2) 2 466 (45) 3 646 2 311 (30) 373 0 1041 
Northern America 2 142 (8) 2 437 (26) 2 953 (57) 2 1116 1 152 (9) 152 0 1682 
Central America 0 368 (.) 0 891 (.) 0 504 (.) 1 689 0 . (.)    
South America 5 368 (.) 2 891 (.) 1 504 (.) 4 1276 0 . (.)    
Central Asia 1 102 (15) 1 72 (10) 2 278 (40) 2 2308 1 250 (36) 720 0 703 
Eastern Asia 1 
1,540 
(42) 0 132 (4) 2 1,867 (51) 2 1867 1 89 (2) 93 0 3628 
Southern Asia 1 753 (74) 1 137 (14) 1 19 (2) 1 406 0 108 (11) 181 0 1018 
South-Eastern 
Asia 1 620 (24) 0 132 (5) 0 1,713 (67) 0 1774 0 108 (4) 181 0 2573 
Western Asia 1 316 (10) 0 132 (4) 3 2,713 (83) 4 2634 2 89 (3) 110 0 3249 
Eastern Europe 4 248 (7) 3 783 (23) 8 2,302 (67) 8 3024 8 116 (3) 200 0 3449 
Northern Europe 5 258 (10) 4 980 (38) 7 1,159 (45) 8 1604 6 156 (6) 156 0 2553 
Southern Europe 4 385 (15) 2 
1,052 
(42) 8 1,002 (40) 9 1125 7 79 (3) 89 0 2517 
Western Europe 4 284 (12) 3 744 (31) 6 1,265 (52) 6 1265 5 139 (6) 139 0 2431 
European Union 15 334 (13) 12 866 (33) 22 1,339 (51) 23 1400 22 98 (4) 105 0 2638 
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Table 8. Weighted averages of soybean production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Soybean Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region 
Ob
s Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual 
Hig
h 
Lo
w  Actual 
Eastern Africa 2 10 (4) 3 31 (11) 0 105 (38) 3 624 2 133 (48) 347 84 279 
Central Africa 1 51 (10) 1 87 (18) 0 105 (22) 1 426 0 244 (50) 320 78 487 
Northern Africa 2 325 (41) 1 2 (0) 1 127 (16) 2 158 1 346 (43) 346 84 800 
Southern Africa 1 44 (19) 0 18 (8) 1 45 (19) 1 471 1 124 (54) 206 50 230 
Western Africa 1 12 (3) 0 18 (5) 0 105 (28) 0 377 0 244 (64) 320 78 380 
Northern America 2 90 (19) 2 40 (8) 2 235 (49) 2 275 2 117 (24) 118 29 482 
Central America 0 110 (13) 3 34 (4) 1 578 (70) 4 218 2 110 (13) 194 47 832 
South America 6 110 (28) 4 54 (14) 4 79 (20) 9 538 8 146 (38) 185 45 388 
Central Asia 1 6 (4) 1 12 (7) 2 69 (38) 2 570 1 92 (51) 150 37 179 
Eastern Asia 2 361 (25) 1 129 (9) 3 456 (32) 3 456 2 500 (35) 849 206 1446 
Southern Asia 4 275 (64) 3 15 (3) 2 3 (1) 4 116 4 140 (32) 391 95 433 
South-Eastern 
Asia 4 88 (13) 3 60 (8) 3 386 (55) 4 415 4 171 (24) 343 83 705 
Western Asia 1 62 (6) 0 39 (4) 2 683 (67) 2 683 2 234 (23) 235 57 1018 
Eastern Europe 4 185 (21) 3 47 (5) 7 519 (59) 7 709 5 130 (15) 243 59 880 
Northern Europe 0 177 (20) 0 55 (6) 1 532 (60) 1 532 0 124 (14) 189 46 888 
Southern Europe 4 188 (28) 1 101 (15) 7 252 (38) 8 282 6 124 (19) 130 31 665 
Western Europe 4 157 (25) 2 28 (4) 4 347 (55) 4 347 2 101 (16) 101 24 634 
Oceania 1 57 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 452 1 86 (.) 113 27  
European Union 10 202 (28) 6 55 (8) 13 353 (49) 13 357 8 108 (15) 133 32 718 
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Table 9. Weighted averages of sunflower production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Sunflower Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region 
Ob
s Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual 
Hig
h 
Lo
w  Actual 
Eastern Africa 2 37 (11) 0 10 (3) 0 23 (7) 1 130 1 263 (79) 263 4 333 
Northern Africa 2 327 (55) 4 10 (2) 4 25 (4) 5 58 3 232 (39) 259 4 595 
Southern Africa 1 82 (37) 0 10 (5) 1 14 (6) 1 143 1 118 (53) 154 3 224 
Northern America 2 35 (13) 2 68 (26) 2 71 (27) 2 84 2 91 (34) 91 1 264 
Central America 0 74 (18) 1 109 (27) 0 38 (9) 1 52 1 189 (46) 189 3 409 
South America 5 74 (24) 4 71 (23) 3 38 (13) 8 173 4 122 (40) 147 2 304 
Central Asia 1 29 (12) 1 11 (5) 2 21 (9) 2 173 2 174 (74) 264 4 235 
Eastern Asia 0 . (.) 0 27 (.) 1 140 (.) 1 140 0 238 (.) 293 5  
Southern Asia 3 331 (56) 1 29 (5) 1 1 (0) 1 30 1 228 (39) 282 5 590 
South-Eastern 
Asia 2 401 (73) 0 27 (5) 1 21 (4) 1 21 1 101 (18) 204 3 551 
Western Asia 2 219 (26) 0 27 (3) 3 201 (24) 4 194 3 402 (47) 406 7 848 
Eastern Europe 4 108 (19) 3 147 (25) 8 172 (30) 8 226 7 154 (26) 184 3 582 
Southern Europe 4 104 (22) 2 188 (40) 8 75 (16) 9 84 7 107 (23) 107 2 474 
Western Europe 3 210 (38) 2 154 (28) 4 105 (19) 4 105 3 81 (15) 81 1 550 
Oceania 1 49 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 137 1 91 (.) 109 2  
European Union 9 155 (30) 7 161 (31) 13 105 (20) 13 107 11 97 (19) 110 2 518 
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Table 10. Weighted averages of rapeseed production cost per hectare ($/ha) and percentage of each cost item over total cost by region 
Rapeseed Fertilizer  
($/ha (%)) 
Labor  
($/ha (%)) 
Machinery  
($/ha (%)) 
Seed  
($/ha (%)) 
Total 
Cost 
($/ha) 
Region Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs Actual Obs High Obs Actual High Low  Actual 
Eastern Africa 1 133 (35) 0 62 (16) 0 13 (3) 1 256 1 175 (46) 254 4 384 
Northern Africa 1 78 (24) 2 62 (19) 2 13 (4) 3 70 0 175 (53) 254 4 329 
Southern Africa 0 106 (30) 0 62 (17) 1 12 (3) 1 131 0 175 (49) 254 4 356 
Northern America 2 216 (48) 2 62 (14) 2 65 (14) 2 77 2 110 (24) 110 2 454 
Central America 0 169 (41) 1 90 (22) 0 36 (9) 1 47 1 118 (29) 129 3 413 
South America 5 169 (43) 3 71 (18) 2 36 (9) 5 160 0 118 (30) 129 3 394 
Central Asia 1 77 (46) 1 10 (6) 2 19 (11) 2 158 0 63 (37) 66 5 170 
Eastern Asia 2 632 (63) 1 217 (22) 3 127 (13) 3 127 1 22 (2) 34 6 997 
Southern Asia 3 446 (83) 2 25 (5) 2 1 (0) 2 33 0 63 (12) 66 5 535 
South-Eastern 
Asia 1 503 (70) 0 41 (6) 0 111 (15) 0 117 0 63 (9) 66 5 718 
Western Asia 1 136 (31) 0 41 (9) 1 192 (43) 1 192 1 76 (17) 76 4 444 
Eastern Europe 4 200 (30) 3 198 (30) 8 158 (24) 8 208 7 111 (17) 114 4 667 
Northern Europe 6 236 (35) 4 240 (36) 8 80 (12) 9 109 8 114 (17) 114 2 671 
Southern Europe 4 262 (46) 1 173 (30) 6 72 (13) 7 80 5 66 (12) 66 2 573 
Western Europe 4 261 (40) 3 208 (31) 7 87 (13) 7 87 6 104 (16) 104 2 659 
Oceania 1 62 (.) 0 . (.) 0 . (.) 1 126 0 . (.)    
European Union 15 266 (42) 11 203 (32) 22 93 (14) 23 97 21 79 (12) 80 2 641 
 
 
 
 
